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THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM

by

Kenneth B. Pyle

Executive Summary

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The Problem of Japanese Nationalism

Underlying much of the discussion about Japan's future international role is the problem of Japanese nationalism. Both in Japan and abroad, memories of the fanatical qualities of prewar nationalism continually cause concern about its revival. The often unspoken assumption is that the Japanese people are particularly prone to an irrational and extreme nationalism. Today, as Japan perceives itself to have caught up with the Western world, a pervasive nationalist mood is rising in the country. Japan's postwar policy of staying out of international politics (what I call the "Yoshida Doctrine") has been the subject of intense debate both among policy makers and opinion leaders. At the heart of the debate is the issue of Japan's future strategic posture and whether to adopt a more assertive international role. In the course of this debate, new currents of nationalism have come to the surface. This paper makes an assessment of the forms that nationalism is taking and the forces shaping it.

The Nature of Prewar Nationalism

Before turning to manifestations of contemporary nationalism, it is worth considering the characteristics of prewar nationalism, the possible revival of which has caused much concern: 1) it was driven by an intense desire to catch up with the Western world; 2) it was mobilized and shaped from above by the elites, particularly the bureaucracy; 3) it was created by the manipulation of traditional cultural symbols; 4) it had its social basis in the lower middle class and the villages; and 5) its extremes in the 1930s resulted from the coincidence of domestic and foreign crisis and the breakdown of elite leadership.

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Postwar Suppression of Nationalism

Throughout most of the postwar period political nationalism has been suppressed as a result of: 1) the institutional reforms of the American Occupation, which sought to ensure that the prewar ideology could not be revived; and 2) the pacifism of the Japanese people which resulted from their wartime experiences. But political nationalism was also suppressed as a matter of conscious policy by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-54) and his followers who have constituted the mainstream conservative establishment during the last 40 years. The Yoshida School in the party and the bureaucracy believed that the best way to pursue the interests of Japanese society was to pursue an "economics first" policy. At the time of the Korean War when he was under American pressure to rearm, Yoshida formulated the fundamental strategy of postwar foreign policy. The tenets of this "Yoshida Doctrine" are:

1. Japanese economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the U.S. is necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. Not only would this low posture free the energies of her people for productive industrial development, it would avoid divisive internal struggles.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Yoshida's successors in the 1960s and 1970s extended this strategy of a low posture, non-involvement in political strategic issues by building a national consensus for all-out economic growth. The Yoshida School also formulated a variety of measures including the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Three Principles of Arms Exports, and the 1% ceiling on defense spending. This Yoshida strategy worked brilliantly, but its Achilles' heel at home has always been that it entailed a suppression of political nationalism, a conscious decision to adhere to a course that left Japan subject to world political currents in a fashion that was often demeaning to national pride.

The Decline of the Progressive View of the Nation

Despite its acquiescence in American global strategy, the Yoshida Doctrine's low posture helped contain the vocal left-wing opposition to conservative government. Throughout much of the postwar the Progressive view of the nation has

held wide appeal among the intellectual community, the media, organized labor, students, the opposition parties, and certain religious groups, most notably Soka Gakkai. This idealistic view demanded adherence to the role in the world depicted in the Constitution. Japan's mission was to provide an example to the world that a modern industrial nation could exist without arms. Progressives consistently favored unarmed neutrality in the Cold War. To the extent that they opposed subservience to U.S. global strategy and advocated an independent foreign policy, their views represented a left-wing nationalism.

Beginning in the mid-1970s a combination of events has transformed the climate of opinion in Japan and led to an apparent irreversible decline in the appeal of the Progressive view of Japan's role in the world. These events include the relative decline of American power and the Soviet build up in Northeast Asia and the Pacific, creating greater insecurity in Japan's foreign affairs; the change in Chinese foreign policy, undermining the leftwing view in Japan; greatly enhanced self-confidence at home coming from Japan's economic successes and a "siege mentality" that comes from resentment of foreign criticism of Japan's trade practices, creating a pervasive mood of nationalism. Under these circumstances, the entire spectrum of opinion has moved rightward.

Economic Nationalism: The Neo-mercantilist View

Aside from left-wing nationalism, the most notable characteristic of postwar Japanese nationalism had been its depoliticization. Economic nationalism served as an apolitical way of enhancing Japan's international prestige and standing. Economic nationalism grew almost inevitably out of the Yoshida strategy in the 1950s and has had powerful backing from the mainstream of big business, the Ministry of Finance, MITI, the Economic Planning Agency, and the mainstream of the LDP. This coalition held that Japan's geo-political position, its resource endowments, and the structure of its economy led to a conclusion that Japan play the international role of a merchant. Since the mid-1970s this interpretation of Japan's role has been challenged. It is criticized abroad as an irresponsible pursuit of narrow self-interest. At home, it is challenged by the Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the rightwing of the LDP, which advocate a stronger political-strategic posture. Prime Minister Nakasone challenged the Yoshida Doctrine and economic nationalism, but his efforts to take a more resolute stand in international politics have achieved limited results. The coalition favoring economic nationalism and extension of the Yoshida Doctrine remains entrenched, although some of its advocates such as Amaya Naohiro have modified their views.

The Debate Over a National Strategy

Since 1978 a remarkable debate has engaged the Japanese as they reconsider their national security strategy and role in the world. This reconsideration has been brought on by the new climate of opinion. Although progressives as well as new nationalists have joined in this debate, it has tended to center on the conflicting views of political realists and military realists. The former are comfortable with economic nationalism and the Yoshida strategy. They are cautious, pragmatic, shrewd in their narrow pursuit of Japan's self-interest. They seek to limit Japan's strategic role and to prevent the rise of political nationalism. They seek to maintain the U.S. security guarantee by making minimal concessions to American demands. They resist any major readjustment of Japanese foreign policy.

The military realists, on the other hand, are open, decisive and clear about their policy preferences. Recognizing the Soviet military threat and believing Japan should play an active role in the Western camp, they seek a major readjustment of Japan's role, the adoption of a clear and consistent strategic doctrine that would be based upon an active military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Nakasone, the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency have all rallied to this position in a clear effort to depart from the Yoshida strategy.

The Rise of a New Nationalism

The rise of a pervasive nationalist sentiment in the 1980s is in marked contrast to the nationalism of the 1930s. It is formless, free floating, and disembodied. It is not an organized movement sponsored and shaped from above by the bureaucracy. To the contrary, it has arisen from below, as it were, in spite of the wishes of the elites. It is more a mood than a movement. It is a more forward-looking nationalism, less narrow, xenophobic and inward-looking, less based on old values. It is more urban, cosmopolitan, and middle class. It does not grow out of inferiority, of resentment at being behind the West in the production of modern science and technology, or at being influenced by the values and institutions of another culture. It grows out of pride in Japanese achievements, the international acclaim they have brought, and self-confidence in the prospects for the future. Foreign criticism of Japanese trade practices confirms this pride and confidence, for criticism is seen as reflecting the inability of other countries to compete with Japan.

Writers and opinion leaders outside of the government have capitalized on this widespread popular sentiment to offer a new foreign policy orientation. The new nationalists advocate a political and military power

commensurate with Japan's economic strength. Some want to exercise the nuclear option; they all want greater autonomy in foreign affairs and a more equal alliance with the U.S. if it is to be maintained. They are revisionist in their views of the Pacific War, the Occupation, the Constitution, and the postwar system of government. They are harsh critics of the Yoshida Doctrine.

Although broadly reflecting a popular mood, nationalism has specific groups behind it: young business executives, certain sections of labor, some of the new religions, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the right wing of the LDP.

Nationalism and the Successor Generation

Four different generations with distinctive experiences and concerns with regard to nationalism are discernible in Japan.

First is the prewar generation whose education was completed by the 1930s. Its members have a strongly inbred sense of catch-up nationalism and of the traditional values of collectivism that were inculcated in a myriad of ways during the prewar period. Despite the vicissitudes of the past 40 years they tend to remain instinctively attached to prewar institutions and values.

Second is the wartime generation which came to maturity during the war and actually fought the war. They are concerned with the relation of the individual and the nation; while defending postwar institutions and democratic values they are critical of postwar materialism and the failure to formulate a sense of national purpose in the pursuit of economic ends. They tend to seek a bridge between the prewar devotion to the nation and the postwar commitment to private ends.

Third, the postwar generation is Japan's "successor generation" since its members will be moving into positions of responsibility during the remainder of this century. They have a swelling self-confidence but a weak sense of Japanese identity. Having no memory of war, defeat, or occupation, and coming to maturity during a time when Japan has been sheltered from international politics, they have known only success and have little sense of limits on what it is possible for them to achieve. Growing up, they have been subject to left-wing nationalism that is essentially anti-American. The combination of untempered confidence in their abilities and restless search for a clearer sense of their Japanese identity seems capable of producing a stronger and more conservative nationalism as time goes on. Young business executives in the Japanese Junior Chamber of Commerce have shown strong nationalism.

Fourth, a still more conservative generation began to take shape in the late 1970s. Basically oriented to the status quo, it is decidedly less idealistic than the postwar generation. It has limited sympathy for progressive causes. Youth support for the LDP has greatly increased; but this new conservatism has not yet translated into a greater patriotism.

A Japanese Identity for the Twenty-first Century

With a strong sense of having fulfilled their overriding ambition of the past century by catching up to the West, the Japanese elites are presently building a national consensus around a new set of goals to replace the old fulfilled ones. Though trying to avoid a narrow political nationalism, the goals have much to offer Japanese pride and self-esteem. They envision nothing less than Japanese global leadership in economic and technological development, the pioneering of a new technocratic society -- in short, world leadership in the non-military aspects of the international system. The Ministry of Finance has been at the center of much of this planning. It is possible to regard these ambitions as the extension of the Yoshida Doctrine into the twenty-first century. The thinking about the twenty-first century is remarkable for its optimism about the projected "information society" and its belief that the Japanese people are best suited to meet the challenges of creating this society. Among most planners there is optimism that Japan can remain free of political strategic concerns. Many influential Japanese profess to believe that the importance of military power in international relations is declining owing to the advent of nuclear weapons, increased economic interdependency, and a growing global consciousness. But the issue is debated.

Conclusion

Nationalism in Japan today is best described as a mood, in the sense that it is pervasive but formless. It is difficult to find a nationalist movement. Nationalism exists under conditions radically different from prewar days: Japan has caught up; the mainstream elites seek to contain political nationalism; traditional nationalist symbols have limited appeal; Japanese is transformed socially and involved in proliferating international contacts. As the rightward shift of opinion and the increased conservatism of young Japanese suggest, this nationalist mood is likely to grow.

At the policy level it is not yet clear how this mood will be reflected in concrete ways. The mainstream elites continue to prefer to limit Japan's strategic-political involvements in order to concentrate on world technological leadership. We need not regard nationalism as dangerous;

rather we can scarcely expect Japan to bear an appropriate share of the defense burden without the continued development of the political dimensions of nationalism. A political nationalism would be threatening only if it took place under conditions of mounting trade frictions and resentment over the unequal aspects of the alliance. Creative American statesmanship should encourage the emergence of a healthy political nationalism, resolution of trade problems, and the establishment of a more equal alliance relationship.

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I. The Problem of Japanese Nationalism

Japan's emergence as the world's second largest economy and its increasing capacity to develop the most advanced technologies raise profound questions as to its future role in the world and how it will be accommodated into the international system. French Foreign Trade Minister Michel Jobert remarked in 1982 how calm and peaceful the world would be without the Soviet Union and Japan. In short, Japan's economic power is increasingly perceived as disruptive and challenging to the existing international order.

For most of the past forty years, while forging to the front rank of global economic power, Japan has stayed out of international politics, remaining passive, avoiding controversy, and shunning political-strategic initiatives. Its behavior seemed more appropriate to an international trading firm than a nation-state. This was a conscious policy, worked out by Prime Minister Yoshida and his successors, and it has had a broad popular consensus behind it; but despite the tenacity of this "Yoshida doctrine," it is clear that there are challenges of many kinds to its continuation. International conditions have changed. An intense domestic debate over strategic options for the future has erupted in the 1980s. At its heart is the issue of whether the nation should adopt a more assertive, indeed nationalist, stance in foreign policy. In the course of this debate new currents of Japanese nationalism have come to the surface. This is perhaps the single most noteworthy aspect of this historic debate. Several important recent studies by Japanese scholars have called attention to this nationalism, its varieties, including a palpable

anti-American variety, and the generational contrasts inherent in the different varieties.

The powerful emotional drives that led the Japanese in the 1930s to try to build a great Asian empire have left an indelible, often unspoken, impression of the Japanese as fundamentally an irrational and fanatical people. Both their prewar imperialism and their postwar singleminded pursuit of economic growth are seen as evidence of their emotional drives. As Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown worried about pressing Japan to rearm because, he said, "the Japanese, as their economic activities show, do not do things by halves."¹ George Ball, as Under-secretary of State, was more blunt. "You never know," he said, "when the Japanese will go ape."² Ball regarded the Japanese as a people motivated by "pride, nationalism and often downright irrationality." He held that the Japanese people have shown an historical pattern of sudden, careening changes of national course. He spoke of "the striking fact that Japanese history has never been charted by the same kind of wavering curve that has marked the progress of other countries; instead it resembles more a succession of straight lines, broken periodically by sharp angles as the whole nation, moving full speed ahead, has suddenly wheeled like a well-drilled army corps to follow a new course. There is nothing in all human experience to match it."³ He wrote of the sudden turns of the rudder: from closed country to all-out borrowing from the West in the nineteenth century, from the all-out imperialism through military pursuit to single-minded commercial concerns since World War Two. There was, he implied, something dangerous and untrustworthy in this character trait of the Japanese people. He feared that postwar pacifism might give way to a militant

nationalism. The Japanese themselves have articulated this unease about their own nature. The sociologist Nakane Chie makes the same point in observing that the Japanese have no universal principles to guide their actions but instead are creatures of the situations they find themselves in.

The Japanese way of thinking depends on the situation rather than principle--while with the Chinese it is the other way around....We Japanese have no principles. Some people think we hide our intentions, but we have no intentions to hide. Except for [a] few leftists or rightists, we have no dogma and don't ourselves know where we are going. This is a risky situation, for if someone is able to mobilize this population in a certain direction, we have no checking mechanism....If we establish any goal we will proceed to attain it without considering any other factors. It is better for us to remain just as we are. For if we are set in motion toward any direction, we have just too much energy and no mechanism to check its direction.

The recent trade friction with the United States has evoked warnings from Japanese leaders that the result will be a nationalist revival. Okita Saburo, former Foreign Minister and one of Prime Minister Nakasone's chief advisors on the trade situation told foreign reporters, in April 1985 following the unanimous Senate resolution condemning Japanese trade practices, that "there is the concern that, if we are pressed too much by a foreign government, it may arouse nationalistic sentiment. This would really damage Japan. At the same time if you have a nationalistic, unfriendly Japan in this part of Asia, the whole U.S. policy would be upset."⁵

Japanese leaders are of course aware of the American concern about Japanese nationalism. They understand that Americans are ambivalent about pressing the Japanese very hard on rearmament issues and are restrained in the trade disputes from inflaming a nationalism that might prove irrational. One of Japan's leading strategic thinkers has urged a more shrewd use of nationalism as a threat to forestall

American pressure on Japan to rearm. Nagai Yonosuke argues that Japan has great bargaining power because "if U.S. pressures on Japan were to overstep the limits of tolerance" then Japan could go nationalist, mobilize its vast potential, revise the constitution and move to full-scale rearmament including nuclear weapons. "The awareness held by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries bordering ... of this potential threat serves as a source of Japan's bargaining power because it deters these countries from exerting pressure on Japan."⁶

Former MITI Councilor, Amaya Naohiro, has revealed how he referred to the danger of Japanese nationalism in negotiating an automobile agreement with the Americans in the spring of 1981. He relates how he privately warned William Brock, the U.S. Special Trade Representative, of the irrational and emotional side of the Japanese people; if they were subject to undue pressure they would erupt in a "narrow nationalism." At the same time he publicly admonished his countrymen to avoid an emotional nationalism which he called "soap nationalism" (sopu nashonarizumu) since it has the emotional character of a soap opera.⁷

More recently, in May 1985, writing in the magazine Boisu (Voice) he decried "goat nationalism" (yagi nashonarizumu), Japan locking horns with the United States and refusing to compromise a step. The Asian Wall Street Journal in its May 6, 1985 edition observed that senior American administration officials are wary about pushing too hard on trade issues because it could weaken the prime minister and because "there's a good deal of nationalism brewing among younger Japanese."

This paper will seek an assessment of the forms that Japanese nationalism is taking in the 1980s and the forces that are shaping the

nationalist views. It will examine ways in which the postwar economics-first policy is being challenged and the ways in which the elite is trying to readjust national goals. Differences of generational outlook will be studied to ascertain what effect they may have on future developments.

II. The Nature of Prewar Nationalism

Concern about revival of Japanese nationalism both inside and outside of Japan is discussed with the historical memory of the narrow chauvinism of the 1930s in mind. MITI's Amaya, in admonishing his countrymen in May 1985 to avoid "goat nationalism," referred to the damage done to national interest by Matsuoka Yosuke when he led the Japanese delegation out of the League of Nations in 1933. We need to review the special nature of and the circumstances that gave rise to the ultra-nationalism of the period 1931-1945:

1. Nationalism was driven by an intense desire to catch up with the Western world. In the 1860s, Japan was thrust into an international environment that threatened its survival as an independent state. The catch-up desire was first a matter of national survival but it became a matter of pride and status; and the goal of the nation became equality with the Western Powers. The Foreign Minister in the 1880's described Japan's goal as the building of a European-style empire off the coast of Asia. From the 1860s down to the 1980s, the Japanese have constantly measured their status and assessed their position in the hierarchy of nations. In the prewar period the criteria were industry and empire. Japan was driven by a strong sense of insecurity and inferiority toward the Western Powers from whom they had to import modern institutions and technology.

2. It might be assumed that without linguistic, ethnic or religious differences to overcome, nationalism grew naturally and inevitably out of Japan's hierarchical social structure and cultural homogeneity. Nationalism, however, did not well up spontaneously from the people. On the contrary, it was mobilized and shaped from above by

the elites for their own purposes, i.e. to justify their own power and to evoke the massive effort required to achieve industrial and imperial greatness. The government used education, the military, and communications. It organized national youth groups and military associations which reached down to the village level. It organized an ever intensifying series of bureaucratic campaigns to mobilize national loyalties and suppress social unrest and tension.

3. Nationalism was created and shaped by drawing on traditional cultural symbols. How else, other than putting it in familiar terms, could a rural people emerging from centuries of feudal isolation be motivated for the hard tasks and sacrifices of building a modern nation-state? The bureaucracy took hold of the native folk religion, politicized it, and introduced the imperial institution as its supreme symbol. State Shinto was the product: manipulating Confucian symbols, the concept of the family state was set forth as traditional family system writ large.

4. Nationalism had its social basis in the lower middle class and in the villages of Japan. The collectivist values of nationalism were the ones familiar to the villages, where 80% of the politically participant Japanese in the 1930s had been born and raised. All classes of Japanese were deeply imbued with patriotic sentiment but the real bearers of ultranationalism were the shrine priest, the village headman, the school principal, the leader of the local military association and youth group. These were basically rural people who had risen only half-way up the educational ladder to success and who resented the cosmopolitanism and "modern" ways of the city.

5. The extremes of nationalism in the 1930s sprang from the coincidence of domestic and foreign crisis and the breakdown of elite leadership. The depression hit Japan at a time of great social unrest caused by industrialization and the spread of radical ideologies. Chinese nationalism threatened Japan's position on the continent. The closing of foreign markets intensified the crisis. A strong coherent elite leadership upon which the constitutional structure depended disappeared in the 1930s.

Since the historical memory of Japanese postwar nationalism often conditions discussions of its possible revival, it will be useful to bear in mind these special characteristics. The changes of the past fifty years have created conditions that would bring about a very different form of nationalism. Japan's catch-up period came to an end in the 1970s. By almost any measure the Japanese perceive themselves no longer a follower nation. To take one recent dramatic example, a survey conducted by the Economic Planning Agency in 1985 found that, among Japan's 1600 leading firms, 90% believe they have caught up with or surpassed the technological capacity of American firms.⁸ A nationalist revival would not be based upon a sense of inferiority, as it was before. Moreover, the indications are that generally the elites are not trying to promote nationalism. On the whole, they are anxious to contain it, in contrast to the prewar period. Nor would traditional cultural symbols draw widespread popular support as they did in the 1930s. The Japanese people are overwhelmingly urban; they have developed cosmopolitan interests and tastes and they are surely among the best read and informed people in the world. In short we must expect

Japanese nationalism to be very different. History is relevant, but it is not predictive.

III. The Suppression of Nationalism in Postwar Japan

Until recently we have tended to look at Japan's postwar political passivity and its shunning of involvement in international political strategic issues as the product, first, of the institutional reforms imposed by the American Occupation and, second, of a popular pacifism shaped by the wartime trauma and the utter discrediting of the prewar state. Both of these factors are certainly true. American reforms were intended to sweep away all aspects of prewar nationalism and establish a liberal democratic state that would possess checks against the revival of nationalism. The Japanese people supported these reforms because of their wartime disillusion, their revulsion from Japanese nationalism, and profound distrust of traditional state power. We shall turn to this popular pacifist sentiment and the progressives who supported it politically. Nevertheless, as a result of much recent research, we now know that the fundamental orientation toward economic growth and political passivity in foreign affairs was also the product of a carefully constructed and skillfully implemented foreign policy. In fact, the establishment of this policy is the essential theme of postwar political history. The key figure in shaping the postwar conception of Japanese national purpose was Yoshida Shigeru, recently named by an overwhelming percentage of Japanese in a poll conducted by the magazine Bungei shunju as "the most important Japanese of this century."⁹ Yoshida, who was Prime Minister for seven of the first eight and one-half years of the postwar period, and who served concurrently as Foreign Minister during much of this time, dominated the postwar political scene and, as we shall see, much of the debate in the last several days revolves around the basic strategy he worked out 35 years ago. In

particular, the new nationalists have made the "Yoshida Doctrine" a target of some of their sharpest attacks.

Yoshida, his group of political disciples, and their vision of Japan's fundamental purpose and orientation in the world, became the conservative establishment (hoshu honryu) which has held sway to the present. The conservative-establishment line, as developed by the Yoshida School, stressed an "economics first" policy and the suppression of political nationalism. Yoshida and his conservative followers were all sentimental nationalists. Yoshida was basically emotionally drawn to the prewar system and referred to himself as the "Emperor's loyal servant." The Pacific war with the United States was "a historic stumble," certainly not the result of a flawed system in the way the Americans thought. Still in the reality of the situation the issue was how best to pursue Japan's national interest. It is worth recounting how Yoshida negotiated the establishment of Japan's relations with the U.S. because it set the pattern for all subsequent negotiations with the U.S. down to the present.

Yoshida, observing to a colleague in 1946 that "history provides examples of winning by diplomacy after losing in war," believed that by shrewdly observing the shifting relations among world powers Japan could take advantage of them to minimize the damage suffered and end up winning the peace. Yoshida seized on the opportunities that Soviet-American estrangement offered Japan. The danger was that Japan would be sucked into the vortex of Cold War politics, expend its limited and precious resources on remilitarization, and postpone the full economic and social recovery of its people. The opportunity offered by the Cold War, on the other hand, was to make minimal concessions of passive

cooperation with the Americans in return for an early end to the Occupation and a long-term guarantee for its national security. This would open the way for all-out economic recovery and return Japan to favor with the Western democracies. In protracted negotiations with John Foster Dulles, Special Emmissary of the Secretary of State who sought Japanese rearmament at the outset of the Korean War, Yoshida cleverly resorted to what Nagai Yonosuke recently categorized as "blackmail by the weak."¹⁰ He refused to accede to Dulles' demands for rearmament by making light of Japan's security problems and vaguely insisting that she could protect herself through her own devices by being a peaceful democracy and relying on the protection of world opinion. After all, he went on, Japan has a constitution which, inspired by American ideals and the lessons of defeat, renounces arms; and the Japanese people are determined to uphold it and to adhere to a new course in world affairs! Dulles, by contemporary accounts, was "flabbergasted" and nonplussed by this performance. Yoshida further argued that rearmament would impoverish Japan and create the kind of social unrest that the Communists wanted. Through the recently published research of Professor Igarashi Takeshi of the University of Tokyo, the most careful historian of this period, we now know that Yoshida even conspired with the Socialist leadership to whip up anti-rearmament demonstrations and campaigns during Dulles' visits!¹¹ Yoshida further pointed out to Dulles the fears that other countries had of a revived Japanese military; and he enlisted MacArthur's support in his resistance to Dulles' pressure. MacArthur obligingly urged that Japan remain a non-military nation and instead contribute to the free world through her industrial production. Yoshida's firmness spared

Japan from military involvement in the Korean War and subsequent conflicts and allowed it instead to profit enormously from procurement orders. Yoshida privately called the economic stimulus of the Korean War "a gift of the gods." Over the coming decades there were to be more such gifts.¹²

In the protracted negotiations with Dulles, Yoshida made minimal concessions of American bases on Japanese soil and a very limited rearmament, sufficient to gain Dulles' agreement to a peace treaty and a post-Occupation guarantee of Japanese security. What we may call a "Yoshida Doctrine" began to take shape in these negotiations. Its tenets were:

1. Japan's economic growth should be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the United States is necessary for this purpose.

2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. Not only would this low posture free the resources and energy of her people for productive economic development, it would avoid divisive internal struggles--what Yoshida called a "thirty-eighth parallel in the hearts of the Japanese people."

3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Yoshida's followers, the Conservative establishment, built on these foundations. They played a shrewd and pragmatic hand, decisive when necessary, often ambiguous, but ever pursuing Japan's national interest in a single-minded but inconspicuous way. Under Yoshida's key economic advisor, Ikeda Hayato, who became prime minister in 1960, the

tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine were consolidated into a national consensus. Ikeda's predecessor, Kishi Nobusuke, had raised the divisive political issues of constitutional revision and rearmament, and his administration concluded in the Security Treaty demonstrations, the greatest mass demonstrations in Japanese history. The right wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party found the rejection of political nationalism an unacceptable price to pay for the security guarantee. This anti-mainstream sector of the conservatives continues to this day to favor the reassertion of traditional national symbols and a more assertive stance in political-strategic affairs.

Ikeda, however, returned to Yoshida's course. Working with his economic advisor, Shimomura Osamu, he fashioned a national consensus for economic growth and built an indomitable group within the bureaucracy to press this policy, made up of the bureaucrats within the Economic Planning Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

Under subsequent Yoshida proteges, especially Sato Eisaku who succeeded Ikeda and held the prime ministership longer (1964-72) than any other individual in Japanese history, the Yoshida Doctrine was further elaborated in terms of nuclear-strategic issues:

1. In 1967 Sato enunciated the three non-nuclear principles, which helped to calm pacifist fears aroused by China's nuclear experiments and the escalation of war in Vietnam. The three principles held that Japan would neither produce, possess, nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its soil. Lest these principles be regarded as unconditional, Sato clarified matters in a Diet speech in 1968 in which he described the four pillars of Japan's non-nuclear

policy: 1) reliance on the U. S. nuclear umbrella; 2) the three non-nuclear principles; 3) promotion of world-wide disarmament; and 4) development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In short, the U. S. nuclear umbrella was to be the sine qua non of the non-nuclear principles. Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but progressives called it hypocrisy to proclaim non-nuclearism while taking shelter under another's nuclear umbrella.

2. Also in 1967, Sato formulated the policy of the Three Principles of Arms Exports which provided that Japan would not allow the export of arms to countries in the communist bloc, to countries covered by U. N. resolutions on arms embargoes, and countries involved or likely to be involved in armed conflicts. Subsequently, the Miki Cabinet extended this ban on weapons exports to all countries and defined "arms" to include not only military equipment but also the parts and fittings used in this equipment.

3. Constraining defense expenditures to less than 1% of the gross national product became a practice in the 1960s, though it did not become official government policy until adoption of the National Defense Program Outline in 1976.

4. It was maintained that within the legal framework establishing the Self Defense Forces, that dispatch of troops abroad, even as part of U. N. peacekeeping missions, was prohibited since no such duty had legally been assigned to them. If pursued, the reasoning behind this non-participation in U. N. peacekeeping activities becomes tortuous. The preamble of the Constitution declares Japan will place its trust in the peace-loving peoples of the world to preserve its security; and in the Basic Policies for National Defense of 1957 it makes explicit that

the Japanese state will depend on the United Nations in the long run to deal with external aggression. (Point Four declares that Japanese-U.S. security arrangements will temporarily provide security, "pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.") The implication of this reasoning then is that while intending to depend on the U. N. and the world community, Japan will not in return contribute the necessary support to protect other nations.

5. Yoshida's successors offered several other formulations of both defense and foreign policy which sought to maintain Japan's low political profile and the broad domestic consensus for pursuit of the economics-first policy. The concept of an "exclusively defensive defense" (senshu boei) declared that Japanese troops and weapons would have no offensive capacity. Jets, for example, would not have bombing or mid-air refueling capabilities. Another concept, "comprehensive security" (sogo anzen hoshō), was an attempt at a broader definition of security that would include such things as foreign aid and earthquake disaster relief and, therefore, mitigate attention to purely military aspects of defense. "Omni-directional foreign policy" (zenhoi gaiko), which was stressed in the wake of the oil crisis held that Japan should seek friendship from all countries in order to maintain access to energy, raw materials, and smooth trading relations.

The Yoshida Doctrine, as it was first worked out in the Dulles-Yoshida negotiations in the early 1950s and subsequently elaborated over the next three decades has proved a brilliant but delicate balance of groups and interests on the Japanese political scene. It represented a political compromise with American demands for a greater Japanese

military involvement. Initially, Yoshida offered military bases and a commitment to gradual rearmament; later a National Self Defense Force and other minimalist concessions could be made. At the same time, Yoshida could warn the Americans of the necessity of giving priority to the improvement of living standards so as to forestall left-wing strength. Throughout, the Yoshida School has had a shrewd awareness of American ambivalence about Japan's rearmament: Yoshida and his successors have been keenly aware that apprehension in America, as well as in Europe and Asia, that rearmament might go too far meant that demands for greater arms spending would always be less than wholehearted. The potential of a nationalist revival was therefore a brake on American demands.

Within Japan, the Yoshida Doctrine has maintained a balance between those groups that were concerned with security even at the expense of national pride and those concerned with preservation of national autonomy and sovereignty. Keenly aware of Japan's political-economic vulnerability, it balanced security and economic concerns. Moreover, within the bureaucracy the Yoshida Doctrine came to represent a balancing of bureaucratic conflicts among the Ministry of Finance, MITI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Agency. Finally, Professor Igarashi refers to it as a "domestic foreign policy system" because of the way in which the foreign policies of the opposition groups were accommodated.¹³ The Yoshida Doctrine has been a political compromise between the pacifism of opposition groups and the security concerns of the right-wing conservatives. There has been what appears to be tantamount to a tacit agreement with socialist and pacifist groups that divisive issues of constitutional revision and substantial military

spending would be moderated and priority given to economic growth and social welfare. It has been, in any case, the very essence of the conservative establishment to preempt popular progressive issues in both foreign and domestic affairs to its own electoral advantage. In foreign policy, in addition to all the examples already cited (the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, etc.), another good example is the initiative that Sato took in 1969 to establish the United Nations University in Tokyo. In domestic affairs, the best example is the massive welfare spending that the conservatives undertook in the 1970s.

The Yoshida Doctrine has proved a finely-tuned policy for pursuing Japanese interests within the pressures and constraints at work on Japan. Nevertheless it has always had an Achilles' heel; that is the trade-off made in terms of Japan's amour propre. To depend on another country for its security and to suppress national pride has never been easy, particularly for the conservatives whose emotional attachment to nationalism is naturally strong. The resentment they feel at the situation is never far from the surface. In a frequently recounted incident, the conservative leader Shiina Etsusaburo once in Diet proceedings referred to the Americans as "the dog at the gate (banken)," protecting Japan. When another Diet member asked if it wasn't rude and insulting to call the Americans "dogs," Shiina in mock apology responded, "Excuse me. They are honorable dogs at the gate (banken-sama)."¹⁴ The leading theorist of the Conservative establishment, Kosaka Masataka, frequently says that the greatest challenge of the Yoshida strategy is how to maintain national morale.

IV. The Decline of the Progressive View of the Nation

The rise of a new nationalism in recent years has been accompanied by the decline of the progressive view of the Japanese national identity. Once the dominant view of the postwar state, cited by conservative leaders as well as opposition parties, the progressive image was the face Japan showed to the world. It vigorously rejected nationalism as an element of the national identity, preferring to see Japan as the vanguard of an idealist vision of the future world order in which the nation-state's role was eclipsed by a new internationalism.

The finest hour of the progressives was the postwar reform era. Their idealism emerged out of war-time disillusion, revulsion from Japanese nationalism, and the profound distrust of traditional state power. They took their stand in support of the new postwar democratic order and, above all, of the role that the constitution envisioned for Japan in the world. Progressives argued that it was Japan's unique mission to provide an example that a modern industrial nation could exist without arms, that Japan could show the way to a new world in which national sovereignty would be foresworn; nation-states, which they regarded as artificial creations, would disappear, allowing the naturally harmonious impulses of the world's societies to usher in a peaceful international order. It was their belief that the Japanese people, having been deceived by a reactionary leadership and seduced by a false national pride, had themselves by their aggressions in Asia demonstrated to the world the demented course of the modern nation-state. As the first victims of the advent of atomic weapons, the Japanese people could convincingly argue that wars were ever more destructive, that a new age was at hand, and that the sovereign

prerogative to go to war must be renounced. Out of their sins and suffering had come a new national mission; and no other people in the postwar era embraced the liberal hope for the future world order with the enthusiasm of the Japanese, for no other people's recent experiences seemed to bear out so compellingly the costs of the old ways. This ideology of the progressives opposed the foreign policy orientation of Yoshida and the conservatives. It opposed rearmament and American bases on Japanese soil, arguing instead for an unarmed neutrality in the Cold War. Up to the 1970s the progressive ideology drew its strength from the most articulate parts of society: the intellectual community, the media, organized labor, students, the opposition parties, and certain religious groups, most notably Soka Gakkai.

Progressives reject any role for Japan in power politics. Writing in the Soka Gakkai newspaper, Seikyo shinbun, January 26, 1985, the President of the Soka Gakkai, Ikeda Daisaku, held that "Peace must be in no way related to force, neither economic nor, much less, military. Peace hiding behind force is no peace at all." Progressives argue that military power is no longer the wave of the future and that it will not be a quality upon which national greatness will be determined. Their vision of the future, Tsuru Shigeto, editorial adviser to the Asahi Shinbun and long-time progressive ideologue, wrote in 1980, is of a country that will be "oriented toward respect for man." Japan should aspire to be a model of humanitarian ideals; it should strive to be known as the health-care center of the world, a country of extraordinary scenic beauty to be visited by peoples from around the world, the leader in promotion of cultural exchange, the sponsor of the United Nations

University, and the most generous contributor to developing countries and to refugee relief.¹⁵

While this idealistic vision retains a powerful emotional appeal for the Japanese people, it is clear that the progressives have far less influence over Japanese opinion than they had even a decade ago. As much of the rest of this paper will demonstrate, a profound change in the climate of opinion as regards Japan's role in the world has taken place since the mid-1970s. The reasons are many and complex. We need only allude to them here. They have to do primarily with changes in the international environment of the country that have led to increasing appreciation of Japan's security issues: growing awareness of Soviet power as a result of the buildup in the Northern territories, the Western Pacific, and the invasion of Afghanistan; the reduced American presence in Asia during the 1970s; the reversal of China's attitude toward Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; the heightened sense of vulnerability brought on by the oil crisis; and the strains in the alliance with the United States created by the "Nixon Shocks" and the mounting trade friction. These factors had the effect of weakening what has been called "the greenhouse effect," the artificial environment created by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which had insulated Japan from the reality of international politics.

At home, the achievements of high economic growth from the 1950s to the 1970s inevitably brought enhanced self-esteem and confidence in Japan's cultural values and in the abilities of its people. This combination of greater insecurity and enhanced self-esteem brought about a new climate of opinion that has substantially undermined the strength of the progressive ideology and its support groups.

Support for the progressive cause has fallen off noticeably in the intellectual community. One of the most notable developments of the past decade is the growing number of intellectuals working closely with the government ministries and the LDP. During Prime Minister Miki's administration a trend of consulting with intellectuals on an informal basis began. Fukuda discontinued the practice, but Prime Minister Ohira brought intellectuals squarely into the policy planning process and that trend has, if anything, escalated under Nakasone. We shall have more to say about this trend, but there is in my judgment much greater support of the government's policy and an emerging collaboration with government from the intellectuals.

Likewise media support for the progressives has dropped off. The liberal economist, Komiya Ryutaro, in a thoughtful essay in 1979, wrote of the rightward drift of opinion. He estimated that until the mid-1960s, 80 per cent of the opinion leaders were of the progressive persuasion, but that this situation has been reversed and 80 per cent are now of center or conservative leaning.¹⁶ Affluence has undermined the appeal of socialism, writes Ijiri Kazuo, editorial writer for the Nihon keizai shinbun, explaining that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people identify themselves as middle class and are not persuaded by theories of conflicting class interest: "The leftist intellectuals have not been able to cope with the sweeping changes that have occurred in the masses themselves over the past 20 years or so."¹⁷ Moreover, the traditional intellectual influences have been replaced by the leadership of "middle-class intellectuals" by which Ijiri means editorial writers, columnists in the media, bureaucrats, and businessmen, who lack the depth and background of academic

intellectuals, but who are more in tune with middle-class values. Ijiri points to surveys showing that 90 per cent of the Japanese people now regard themselves as middle class. Intellectuals of the progressive persuasion have failed to provide values consonant with the real conditions of economic growth. The middle class intellectuals, on the other hand, address themselves to the tastes and interests of this broad middle class. Above all, their writings often dwell on Japanese character and traditions and feed the appetite for self-reflection. In addition to the role of the print media in the rightward drift of opinion, television has also been significant, I am told. Talk show leaders, such as Takemura Kenichi whose morning show "Seso Kodan" (Forum on Current Affairs) has a mass following, have also been important in the rise of "middle class intellectuals" and the rightward shift of the political spectrum.

One of the most striking changes that occurred at the end of the 1970s was the rather sudden emergence of conservatism among the younger generation. Students who had once been one of the most vocal supporters of the progressive view of the national identity have clearly deserted the cause. We shall have more to say about this development when we focus on generational variation.

It appears as well that labor groups no longer provide the same strong support of the progressive cause. The Japanese Teachers Union, to take one notable example, has been less effective in its support of progressive politics and its continuing struggle with the government over issues of centralized control and resurgent nationalism. As Rohlen's recent study concludes, "Most high school teachers have come to criticize both the Ministry of Education and the union. Some openly

express nostalgia for the spirit of the harmonious traditional school."¹⁸

Reflecting this changing climate of opinion, the political parties have adjusted their policy positions in ways that represent a diminished commitment to the progressive ideology. The Komeito has changed its policy orientation to reflect greater support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Similarly, in an effort to reverse the Socialists' declining fortunes, Ishibashi Masashi, who assumed party chairmanship in September 1983, proclaimed a "new realism" and announced a changed policy toward the Self-Defense Forces which would treat them as an unconstitutional but legal entity. This convoluted attempt to break out of the pure negativism of the past threw his party into a confusion and disarray that forced him to make a tactical retreat in which he reassured party members that he still regarded the SDF as "illegitimate." Nonetheless, he has continued to try to move the party in a rightward direction by improving its relations with the United States and South Korea.

Some of the idealism of the past has also tarnished and the progressive approach is sometimes cast in cynical terms. Matsuoka Hideo, the Socialist and Communist Parties' candidate for governor of Tokyo in 1983, argued that Japan should continue to avoid becoming entangled in international politics by deliberately "missing the boat" (nori okure); that is, when international disputes arise, Japan should always "go to the end of the line" and wait quietly, unnoticed, while all other nations step forward to declare their positions on controversial issues. "No matter where or what kind of dispute or war arises, Japan must stand aloof and uninvolved." This is a "diplomacy of

cowardice" (okubyo gaiko), he admitted, but it serves Japan's interests of maintaining good relations with all countries and, thus, preserves its global access to markets and raw materials.¹⁹

I take such cynicism to be evidence of the decline of the progressive ideal. Further evidence of its decline is the increasingly defensive tone that progressives are adopting. In trying to suppress the nationalism of the past, the progressives rested their position on a highly critical evaluation of Japanese political and social values. In recent years, as national self-confidence and pride have grown, the values and institutions espoused by the progressives have been attacked as not being the products of Japanese history and traditions; and there has been an increased effort by progressives to reconcile the postwar system and its values with indigenous traditions. For example, Kamishima Jiro, a prominent political scientist, recently has gone back into Japanese history to find roots for pacifism and disarmament in Japanese tradition. He emphasizes both Hideyoshi's sword hunt of 1588 which disarmed the civilian population and the edict abolishing samurai swords in 1876 which left arms exclusively in the hands of the state. His conclusion that the Japanese people's determination to maintain Article 9 in spite of foreign pressure must be understood as "an extension of the tradition of disarmament in our country" is clearly dubious in light of 600 years of feudal military tradition and popular glorification of the bushido ethic in prewar Japan.²⁰

Besides the effort to meet criticism that the postwar order is alien to Japanese tradition, another indication that the progressives have been put on the defensive is their notable attempts to respond to contentions that unarmed neutralism is unrealistic, utopian, and

divorced from the reality of power politics. Morishima Michio recently set off a vigorous debate in the Japanese media when he wrote that "nations are now protected by 'software' such as diplomacy, economics, or cultural exchange--not by 'hardware' like tanks and missiles, but that if he and the other progressives were wrong and an invasion of Japan did take place by the Soviet Union, Japan would be best off simply to surrender "with a white flag in one hand and a red flag in the other."²¹ Morishima believed that even as a Soviet satellite, Japan could hope to maintain political self-determination at home and to build a decent social democratic society. Progressives argue that unarmed neutrality would offer no cause for being invaded or for becoming involved in conflict. Ishibashi Masashi, the Socialist chairman, makes this argument in his book Hi-buso churitsu-ron (On Unarmed Neutrality) (1983), holding that if he is wrong "the worst that could happen would be a military occupation of the Japanese archipelago." Annihilation of the race and destruction of Japanese culture that would result from involvement in a nuclear war would be averted. The implication of this viewpoint is that progressives are prepared to risk their vision of the future, to accept the consequences if they are wrong, and to argue that the consequences would still be preferable to a full-scale rearmament and involvement in power politics.

Until recently, the progressives' ideology had much to offer Japanese national pride. It favored an independent status, rather than reliance on a foreign power. It offered an international role that was unique, a mission to lead the world to a new order, and therefore a satisfying national identity that could cope with the stigma of imperialism and defeat by rejecting nationalism. But conditions have

clearly changed and the decline of the left-wing view of the Japanese nation seems irreversible.

V. Economic Nationalism: The Neo-mercantilist View

Up to the 1970s the most notable characteristic of postwar nationalism had been its depoliticization. Economic nationalism served as an apolitical way of enhancing Japanese international prestige and standing. The desire to catch up materially with the West was a goal to which the Japanese were responsive because of the personal fulfillment it could bring in their daily lives.

Economic nationalism grew almost inevitably out of the Yoshida Doctrine which sought to separate economics from politics and to concentrate on the economic rehabilitation of Japan. It provided a natural way of refocusing the goals and energies of the people, but it too, like the progressive view, is being challenged and forced to accommodate itself to new conditions and the changing climate of opinion.

This economic nationalism, with its avoidance of political involvements and concentration on a purely economic role, gained powerful backing in the postwar political system. The political scientist Nagai Yonosuke in his recently published book has analyzed the nature of this support, which includes the mainstream of big business, particularly banking and financial circles, the Finance Ministry, MITI, the Economic Planning Agency, and the mainstream of the LDP. This powerful coalition first took shape in the 1950s and Nagai gives this coalition the credit for resisting the temptation to go into arms production and export at the time of the Korean War when American policy appeared to encourage it. If Japan had come to rely on an arms industry to stimulate its economy then, he believes, the economic miracle of the subsequent decades would not have happened.²²

Economic nationalism offered a self-image which competed with the progressive view from the 1960s on, i.e. the mercantilist conception of Japan as a great trading nation--as Venice or Netherlands were in the past. The mercantilists believed that a dispassionate analysis of Japan's geo-political position, its resource endowments, and the structure of its economy led inexorably to a conclusion that Japan play the international role of a merchant.

A leading exponent of this economic nationalism is Kosaka Masataka, one of the country's influential political scientists and one of the key intellectual advisors to the LDP in recent decades. In an article in Chuo koron, entitled "Japan as a Maritime Nation," he defined the national purpose in these terms and he traced its origins to Yoshida.

Japan's postwar involvement with the West...has been primarily economic rather than military, an emphasis chosen by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru at the time of Japan's negotiations with America over the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Yoshida believed that economic matters are more important than military, and, for this reason, he rejected America's suggestion that Japan rearm and spearhead American military strategy in the Far East. Japan's foreign policy has subsequently been simply a kind of "neomercantilism." ...Yoshida's choice has proved a most adequate one for Japan. From a strictly military point of view, Japan's "neomercantilist" diplomacy has been adequate for two reasons: First, the development of nuclear weapons has greatly lessened the ethical justification as well as the effectiveness, of military power. Second, since Japan has been fully protected by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, in terms of defense her own rearmament would have been superfluous. From a political point of view, Yoshida's "neomercantilism" has harmonized with Japan's postwar democratization.

In his 1981 book, Bunmei ga suibo suru toki (When Civilization Declines), Kosaka elaborated his own view. Japan should act the role of a merchant in the world community--a middle man taking advantage of

commercial relations and avoiding involvement in international politics. "A trading nation (tsusho kokka) does not go to war," he wrote, "neither does it make supreme efforts to bring peace. It simply takes advantage of international relations created by stronger nations. This can also be said of our economic activities. In the most basic sense we do not create things. We live by purchasing primary products and semi-finished products and processing them. That is to say, we live by utilizing other people's production." Kosaka emphasized that that is not a popular role in the international order, since it is regarded as selfish and even immoral. Particularly with the United States, it causes problems because "Japan has enjoyed the advantages of being an ally and the benefits of non-involvement." With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis, Kosaka foresaw difficult times as "politics and economics became more intertwined in the economic policies of nations." He believed that Japan could adapt to the new circumstances and survive as a trading nation, if it could manage its crisis of spirit. That is, holding firmly to no clear principles, but merely pursuing commercial advantage, the danger was that the Japanese people might lose self-respect. This is a crisis, he wrote, that all trading nations face. "A trading nation has wide relations with many alien civilizations, makes differing use of various different principles of behavior, and manages to harmonize them with each other. This, however, tends to weaken the self-confidence and identity of the persons engaged in the operation. They gradually come to lose sight of what they really value and even of who they really are." To deal with this psychological burden, trading nations, he concludes, "need the confidence that they are contributing to the world in their own way.

Only by doing so does hypocrisy (gizen) cease to be hypocrisy for hypocrisy's sake. It becomes a relatively harmless method of doing good...." Political nationalism presents dilemmas for the mercantile vision. On the one hand, it is necessary to repress it so as not to allow its intrusion into economic affairs and decision-making. On the other hand, the void of national spirit and pride may rob a people of its self respect and motivation.

Nagai describes MITI as becoming one of the "faithful students of the Yoshida doctrine" when it decided in the early 1950s to join with the Finance Ministry and the EPA in resisting the temptation to rely on an arms industry to acquire foreign capital and advanced technology and instead chose to "strongly press in the direction of internal rationalization of the production process and succeeded in building a healthy industrial base which could twice overcome the oil crises in the 1970s."²³ Nagai cites the writings of Amaya Naohiro as representative of the MITI viewpoint. Amaya, former Councilor of MITI, has been one of the most outspoken and flamboyant advocates of the merchant role. In a series of widely discussed articles marked by their color and candor, Amaya drew analogies from Japan's history to illustrate the role of a merchant nation which he hopes Japan will pursue in a consistent and thorough-going manner.²⁴ He likened international society to Tokugawa Japan when society was divided into four functional classes: samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. The United States and the Soviet Union fulfilled the roles of samurai, while Japan based itself on commerce and industry; third world countries were peasant societies. If the military role of the samurai were not to be exercised, as happened in the Tokugawa period, then it might be possible to conclude that "the

world exists for Japan," but in fact international society was a jungle and it was necessary for the merchant to act with great circumspection. The nation for some time has conducted itself like an international trading firm, he wrote, but it has not wholeheartedly acknowledged this role and pursued it single-mindedly. Amaya wanted the Japanese to show the ability, shrewdness, and self-discipline of the sixteenth-century merchant princes of Hakata and Sakai, whose adroit maneuvering in the midst of a samurai-dominated society allowed them to prosper. "In the sixteenth-century world of turmoil and warfare, they accepted their difficult destiny, living unarmed or with only light arms. To tread this path, they put aside all illusions, overcame the temptation of dependency (amae/no kozo), and concentrated on calmly dealing with reality." By the end of the Tokugawa period, Amaya pointed out, merchants were so powerful that Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) remarked, "In appearance all of Japan belongs to the samurai, but in reality it is owned by the merchants." What was required was to stay the course, to put aside the samurai's pride of principle, and to cultivate the tradesman's information-gathering and planning ability, his tact and art of flattery. "For a merchant to prosper in samurai society, it is necessary to have superb information-gathering ability, planning ability, intuition, diplomatic skill, and at times ability to be a sycophant (gomasuri noryoku)."

In Amaya's view, pride and principle should not stand in the way of the pursuit of profit: "From now on if Japan chooses to live as a merchant nation (chonin koku) in international society, I think it is important that it pursue wholeheartedly the way of the merchant. When necessary it must beg for oil from the producing countries; sometimes it must grovel on bended

knee before the samurai..." The Tokugawa merchant was not above using his wealth to gain his way and Amaya counseled that Japan, similarly, must be prepared to buy solutions to its political problems: "When money can help, it is important to have the gumption to put up large sums."

Since first advocating the purely mercantilist conception of the nation in 1980, Amaya has modified his views to advocate a more active role for Japan in supporting American leadership. In a book published in January 1985 he stresses the fragility of the international free trade system which had so benefited Japan. He argues that the liberal economic order depends on the future commitment of the Americans. The United States had built the free trade system and had often subordinated its immediate economic interests to the long-term political and economic advantages of strengthened economies among its allies and of a strong trading and monetary system that would link these nations. It is the better part of wisdom, he writes, for Japan to encourage the United States, help to revive American industry, and work for a new consensus among industrialized countries to preserve the free trade system.²⁵

Amaya's views, which represent the main stream of thinking in MITI, are an enlightened economic nationalism. His prolific writings in the popular magazines contain frequent admonitions against narrow, emotional nationalism. He fears that Japanese economic success may stir a runaway national pride. In May 1984 he wrote of "Japan as number two" and urged Japanese to think of their role in the international system as "assistant to number one" or as "vice president" (fuku shacho). History shows, he argued, that world leadership requires that a nation possess the following four attributes: 1) military and economic power; 2) a set

of ideals with universal applicability; 3) a rational and exportable system through which it can realize its ideals; and 4) a distinct, viable and transferable culture. Amaya holds that while Japan may be equal to the U.S. in economic power, in other respects "the time is far from ripe for gracing Japan with the title of 'No. 1.'" He concludes that "whether we like to admit it or not, there will be no free world and no free trading system if the U.S. does not preserve them for us.... The best Japan can aspire to is 'Vice President.' For its own sake, it must recognize this and conduct itself with the tact and discretion befitting its real position in the world community."²⁶ Writing in May 1985 he repeatedly implored his countrymen to adopt a rational, long-range view of Japan's national interest, avoid emotional response to foreign pressure over trade issues, and abstain from nationalism. "But unfortunately in both America and in Japan most people are more moved by politics than by economics." Fearful that nationalistic stubbornness will bring on American protectionism he concluded: "If, in the face of American pressure, the Japanese people will react calmly and maintain a wisdom which will distinguish between what are big and small problems then I believe Japanese-American trade friction will not be a worrisome problem.... It is my profound belief that just as Soviet nuclear weapons can destroy the free world from outside, so protectionism can destroy it from within."²⁷

Amaya's initial formulation in 1980 of the purely merchant role for Japan elicited sharp criticism from many quarters. The foreign affairs commentator Ito Kenichi called it a "kowitz foreign policy" (dogeza gaiko) and an "unprincipled foreign policy" (musesso gaiko) that would not be respected or trusted by foreign countries.²⁸ Moreover, Ito

argued that the exclusive concern with preserving Japan's economic interests was already creating a spiritual malaise among the Japanese people since it caused them to sacrifice the self-respect that comes from adherence to a clear set of moral values. Similarly, reflecting the Foreign Ministry's evolution toward a more activist stance, the head of the Ministry's Policy Planning Division, Ota Hiroshi, wrote that the "merchant nation thesis" was possible for Japan in the past when American political and economic powers maintained a world order in which Japan was free to concentrate its efforts entirely on economic gain.²⁹ Both writers, however, held that the decline of American power and the expansion of Japan's global interests made it impossible any longer to separate politics and economics in the way that Amaya's metaphor suggested and that Japan must join in a greater cooperative effort to ensure the security interest of the industrial democracies. Sase Masamori of the National Defense Academy described Amaya's metaphor as a self-complacent and simplistic one which, while bound to be appealing to residual pacifist sentiment that sought to avoid international political involvements, would have no persuasive power abroad. Such a continued shunning of power politics would damage the alliance with the United States, which in the changed international environment was expecting more of Japan.³⁰

Although the merchant-nation thesis came in for increasing criticism at home and abroad in the 1980s, one cannot underestimate its staying power. Prime Minister Nakasone challenged the Yoshida Doctrine and economic nationalism in frontal terms in the early months of his administration, but his efforts to take a more resolute stand in international political matters, while changing the tone of Japanese

diplomacy, have not substantially modified its substance. Those who see Japan's future international role as the leader in developing new technology want Japan to adhere strictly to its role as a commercial democracy. The popular science writer and senior researcher at Nomura Research Institute, Moritani Masanori, one of the leading advocates of this role, wrote in 1982 that "the characterization of Japan as a trading country no longer enjoys its former appeal, but I myself still endorse this designation," arguing that Japan should develop a technological strategy for import expansion by which it would export technology to countries everywhere and import the goods they produce with this know-how. Advocacy of such technological cooperation has become a principal way of winning economic allies abroad, thereby overcoming trade frictions, and revitalizing the merchant-nation role.³¹

Nagai Yonosuke, writing in 1985, is confident that "Japanese wisdom" will prevail in the face of the dangers posed by demands for Japanese-American military cooperation. He believes the efforts of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, and the rightwing of the LDP, all working under Nakasone's patronage in an attempt to adopt a stronger military stance, will be frustrated. He concludes that with the solid support of the strong economic agencies--the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Planning Agency, and MITI--and the LDP mainstream, "the Yoshida Doctrine will be permanent (eien de aru)."³² Rather than be pressed into a greater military role this coalition will stress expansion of domestic demand for housing, social capital, information technology, development of markets, foreign investment, and economic cooperation.

VI. The Debate over National Strategy

The suppression of political nationalism which both the progressives and the mainstream of the LDP sought was successfully maintained down to the late 1970s. But since then nationalism has become a very visible part of the political dialogue in Japan. This development has occurred principally as part of a remarkable debate over national security strategy that has engaged the nation's leadership and the media for the past seven years. In his excellent book published in 1983, Nihon no boei to kokunai seiji (Japanese Defense and Domestic Politics), Professor Otake Hideo, the most careful Japanese student of this debate, has dated its origins from the beginning of 1978 when, in the second year of the Fukuda administration, Kurisu Hiroomi, the chairman of the joint staff council, wrote a withering attack on the prevailing strategic concept of "defensive defense." Kurisu, whom Otake describes as a prewar style nationalist, was dismissed but the incident led to a series of statements by other members of the Fukuda administration and swiftly widened into a grand national debate.³³

The debate was provoked by dramatic changes in Japan's international environment beginning with the Nixon Doctrine, the American humiliation in Vietnam, the relative decline in American world power, discussion of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, the Soviet military buildup in East Asia, the "swing strategy," and the recognition of Soviet-American nuclear parity.³⁴ At the same time, the coincidence of intense trade friction with the United States and a rising sense of Japanese self-confidence over its economic successes was evident on the domestic scene. All of these events inclined Japan to review its security options and the strategy it had pursued since Yoshida's day.

The remarkable debate that ensued, as Nagai writes in his 1985 book Gendai to senryaku (Strategy and the Modern Age), went far beyond security matters: "The strategic debate has profound meaning for the purposes and the core values of the postwar Japanese state. It does not stop with theories of how to defend Japan, but inevitably goes on to philosophical debates about the nature of the postwar state."³⁵

The fact that such an open national debate about security matters has been taking place is in itself significant and indicative of the changing climate of opinion. The course of the debate made clear the decline of the progressive view. It also evoked substantial expressions of a new nationalism. But the debate has tended to center on the views of what I and others have called "the realists." They first emerged in the 1960s as a group opposing the progressive vision of an unarmed and neutral Japan. The realists believed that the institution of the nation-state was not about to disappear, that the strength of nationalist feelings was unabated, and that a competition of national interests within an environment constantly approaching "international anarchy" was the only realistic way of understanding international politics. The realist school tends to see Japan's national interest in a cooperative defense relationship with the liberal democracies; it does not make the radical critique of Japanese society that progressives have made. Nor does it have the progressives' distrust of traditional state power. In fact, typically, many of the proponents of this school have identified with liberal conservatives in the government.

A representative par excellence of realism is Yoshida's biographer, Inoki Masamichi, scholar of international communism, former President of the National Defense Academy and now head of the Research

Institute for Peace and Security. Inoki had been a steady critic of what he called the "utopian pacifist viewpoint" for many years. With other academic scholars like Hayashi Kentaro, he criticized the progressives for failing to make moral distinctions between communist countries and liberal democracies. Inoki opposes a massive rearmament but advocates a steady and significant increase in defense expenditure in cooperation with the Western allies. In the light of the new attitudes and conditions in Japan, the views of realists like Inoki receive a more respectful hearing now than at any time since 1945.

Inoki served as chairman of the Comprehensive National Security Study Group, an advisory committee appointed by the late Prime Minister Ohira, which issued its report in July 1980.³⁶ It represents the clearest statement of the realists' position to date. The Report argues that "the world is not a peaceful world at present, nor is there any possibility that it will become a peaceful world in the foreseeable future." An intelligent approach to securing Japan's interests requires a joint effort with the Western allies: "Because it is not realistic (genjitsu-teki) to place total dependence on the international order and because there is a limit to the effectiveness of self-reliant efforts, it is necessary to take an intermediate position and try to attain security by relying on cooperation among a group of nations sharing common ideals and interests." Thus Japan must overcome the incongruity between its economic power and political weakness by accepting international responsibilities more commensurate with its economic strength. The role of "economic giant and political dwarf" must be replaced by an activist foreign policy and a substantial defense establishment that would cooperate with the Western allies in the

maintenance and management of the international system. The Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East are areas where Japan must contribute politically to stability. Though appointed by the Prime Minister and, hence, basically friendly to sections of the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Group in its Report criticizes the Government for political expediency and lack of candor and of leadership in developing a new defense policy. The Report concludes with the hope that it will serve as a catalyst for vigorous national debate and formation of a consensus in favor of an active political and strategic role in the world.

So far as Article 9 is concerned, realists are divided among themselves. Some argue that it is necessary to revise it in order that the Self-Defense Forces may be rendered constitutional, and more fundamentally, so that Japan can have its full sovereignty restored and become an "ordinary" country again. Others of the realist persuasion, such as Sato Seizaburo, argue that with few exceptions most countries now tolerate certain limitations on their sovereignty; it is not necessary legally to possess the right of belligerency, since no country that has fought since World War II has actually declared war; therefore it is pointless to embark upon an inevitably drawn out and divisive struggle to revise the Constitution.³⁷

In fact, although progressivism and particularly nationalism have been an important and visible part of the strategic debate, the most significant and influential part of the debate so far as immediate Japanese policy formation and assessment is concerned has been among the realists themselves. Their debate is influential and important because it goes on at the very heart of Japanese government among the senior

elites in the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the high financial circles. Two analysts, Professor Nagai in Japan and Professor Mochizuki of Yale, have come up with a useful distinction between the "political realists" and the "military realists."³⁸ The former are adherents of the Yoshida Doctrine and still represent the mainstream of LDP thought; they have been in the past comfortable with the neo-mercantilist view of the Japanese nation. The military realists are largely a new phenomenon emerging in the course of this present debate; they mark a significant departure from the Yoshida Doctrine.

In tone and style, the political realists are pragmatic, cautious, often vague and ambivalent, shrewd in their narrow pursuit of Japanese self-interest, sensitive to domestic and foreign trends, always prepared to adjust their policies to these trends. The political realists seek to keep alive the finely-tuned system of checks and balances in "the domestic foreign policy system" that Yoshida and his successors built. They are concerned with the intricate politics of balancing a variety of domestic and international concerns. Domestically they want to maintain a tranquil public opinion, neither antagonizing pacifist sentiment, nor above all contributing to the rise of nationalism. The latter would mean, for them, loss of mastery, unleashing latent emotions that would make the control of Japanese politics much more difficult for the elites. They also wish to limit military spending and strategic commitments because they will detract from economic growth and development of the most productive new high technologies. Abroad, the concerns to be balanced are many. Most important is to maintain the U.S. security guarantee which they recognize will require a greater contribution as time goes on to satisfy the Americans, but this should

be kept to the minimum necessary. In the past, political realists might have been satisfied with a position of economic nationalism, adhering to the role of merchant nation. But given the increasing pressure from the Americans to make a more substantial contribution in the strategic field and given changed international conditions, they acknowledge the need for greater defense spending. They, nevertheless, generally favor stringing out concessions to American demands, peeling off parts of the elaborately constructed Yoshida Doctrine only as the situation demands. They regard the American assessment of the Soviet threat as substantially overdrawn, believing that the Soviets are inclined to exploit instability in the Third World rather than undertake military action against vital Western interests. Political realists worry about becoming entangled in American military strategy; they would therefore prefer to keep the Soviets at bay through trade and sale of technology. They also prefer to keep a low politico-military profile because of the vulnerability of the Japanese economy.

In contrast to this cautious pragmatism, the military realists are much more open, decisive and clear about their policy preferences. They are forthright in their declarations that Japan is a part of the Western camp and must be forthcoming in assuming a greater share of its military burden. Moreover, their perception of a growing military threat from the Soviet Union justifies their advocacy of a substantial buildup of the Self Defense Forces and a strengthening of the alliance with the U.S. Giving priority to this military threat, they are less inclined to concern themselves with the domestic political constraints or the economic costs of a buildup. Also they are more concerned with Soviet capabilities rather than intentions which they regard as ephemeral.

Thus they move naturally to elaborate strategic discussions and the consideration of concrete war scenarios. Fear that the American alliance will entangle Japan in American military strategy is misguided, they believe, because Japan's geostrategic position makes inescapable its involvement in any superpower conflict--even if it sought to remain neutral. Okazaki Hisahiko, formerly Director General of the Research and Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and recently appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, argues that Japan "is threatened not because of its military alliance but because of its geostrategic situation. It would be unreasonable not to expect a major power to attempt to seize a geostrategically important area before its opponent utilizes it, particularly if the country at issue were inadequately armed."³⁹ Soviet access to the Pacific requires passage of its ships through the straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima and makes Japan critical for control of the Western Pacific.

Nakasone spoke the realist view when, as the newly elected prime minister, he sought to undo the impression of a politically passive Japan during his extraordinary visit to Washington in January 1983. In a series of bold public statements on strategic issues he committed Japan to a more activist role. He decided to allow transfer of purely military technology to the United States in which amounted to a major modification of the Three Principles on Arms Exports. He further said that Japan should aim for "complete and full control" of the strategic straits controlling the Sea of Japan "so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities" in time of emergency. Such a commitment to bottle up the Soviet fleet long had been earnestly sought by the Americans, but had been regarded as too politically

sensitive for public discussion. Going still further, Nakasone said that Japan should be "a big aircraft carrier" (okina koku bakan)--his official translator interpolated this with the colorful phrase "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" (fuchin kubo)--to prevent penetration of the Soviet Backfire bombers into Japanese airspace. Fulfillment of this capability would require a large-scale military build-up that would far exceed the present 1% of GNP limitation. Finally, he repeated statements he had made in Tokyo that there should be no taboos against discussion of constitutional revision; and he added, "the Constitution is a very delicate issue and I have in mind a very long-range timetable, so to speak, but I would not dare mention it even in our Diet."⁴⁰ Although going far beyond his capacity to transform Japan's role, Nakasone gave the military realists a national voice and backing unthinkable even a few years earlier.

The political realists are the very antithesis of Japanese nationalism. With the decline of the progressives, the political realists have become the principal target of the new nationalists. Among LDP leaders, Miyazawa Kiichi is the most representative spokesman of political realism. In a 1980 interview he argued that Japan is "a special state," (tokushu kokka) which owing to its exceptional historical experiences and constitutional restraints, is kept from normal participation in international politics. A former protege of Yoshida and author of an insider's account of the Yoshida era, Miyazawa seeks to preserve the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan must continue in a passive role because the constitution makes Japan "a special state" and requires it to conduct "a diplomacy that precludes all value judgments" (issai no kachi handan o shinai gaiko). The preamble pledges Japan to

trust in "the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world" and, therefore, commits Japan to maintaining friendly relations with all nations. "The only value judgments we can make are determining what is in Japan's interest. Since there are no real value judgments possible we cannot say anything." When challenged politically, Miyazawa says, Japan has no recourse but to defer. "All we can do when we are hit on the head is pull back. We watch the world situation and follow the trends."⁴¹ In a book of discussions with Kosaka Masataka published in 1984, Utsukushii Nihon e no chosen (A Challenge to a Beautiful Japan), Miyazawa defends the postwar system which, he says, has achieved its three major goals: to build a "peace state" (heiwa koku), to establish a free society, and to achieve economic prosperity and a standard of living similar to Western countries. With regard to the first goal, "the Japanese race has gambled its future (unmei) in a great experiment, the first of its kind in human history and fortunately up to today we have succeeded." Similarly Japan had succeeded in establishing a free society with protection for human rights and with distinctions in income distribution smaller than all but two or three Scandinavian countries. "Therefore freedom has been established not only in name but in economic reality and this country is actually the most free in the world." Finally, the nation had achieved economic prosperity, but it was important--and this is his campaign theme in challenging Nakasone's leadership--to continue to pursue economic priorities in order to build up social capital for housing, schools, and to acquire the benefits of "a technological society." Like his mentor, Yoshida Shigeru, Miyazawa uses the vocabulary of the progressives while urging policies of narrow self-interest.

The military realists find this position dangerous. They believe that the time is past when Japan can continue to exist as an exception to the normal pattern of nation states. They are repelled by justifications of Japan's withdrawn international behavior that rely on Article 9, the nuclear allergy, the three non-nuclear principles, the postwar legacy of pacifism, and other such extraordinary explanations. Sase Masamori, a professor at the National Defense Academy, decried Miyazawa's views of Japan's exceptional role in the international system. It "violates international common sense" to rely on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty but to deny its military implications and to rely on the American nuclear umbrella but not to allow passage of nuclear weapons through its waters. To behave like an "international eccentric" (kokusai-teki henjin), said Sase, is to invite scorn; to wander international society "peddling one's special national characteristics" is to risk diplomatic isolation.⁴²

The political realists, however, continue to resist a major readjustment of Japanese foreign policy. In a January 1985 article in Chuo koron on the qualities Japan will require in the Twenty-First Century, Kosaka Masataka stresses the importance of avoiding a national ideology and of adhering to a flexible pragmatism in its foreign policy. He offers the following arguments against those who say that Japan must bear a greater share of the military burden in support of the Western allies: 1) because of the stalemate between the two nuclear superpowers, the positive uses of military power are few; 2) since protecting Japan and maintaining peace in the Pacific are in America's own national interest "it may not be necessary for us to pay a large cost"; 3) since Japan has become a source of credit and exports to the

U.S., the Japanese-American relationship cannot be easily broken even if Japan contributes no more militarily. Kosaka implies that every effort should be made to maintain the Yoshida Doctrine. He recognizes this creates "a serious identity problem for the nation." Japan must therefore "preserve an indomitable spiritual strength without having any clear-cut and explicit principles." This argument, the antithesis of nationalism, is the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine and of political realism. Because of its thoroughgoing pragmatism and the absence of any ideals upon which to base its position Kosaka admits that while "it possesses wisdom it lacks theoretical consistency."⁴³ Thus when pressed by the United States in trade and security issues it has constantly to give way. Japanese national pride, in my judgment, will not indefinitely support such an approach.

Another self-described political realist, Nagai Yonosuke, one of the country's leading political scientists and strategic thinkers, has tried to describe political realism in strategic terms. As we have seen, he believes that the present role of the Japanese nation has extraordinary durability because of the strong consensus and coalition of forces that support it. Nagai wrote in January 1981: "Despite the questionable nature of its origins, the new constitution has weathered thirty-five years, has been assimilated to Japanese traditions and culture, and, in a word, has been Japanized. In my judgment, the Japanese people will refuse to ever again become a state in the traditional sense but will choose to exist as a kind of 'moratorium state'."⁴⁴ Nagai believes that "the incongruity of status" between Japan's great economic power and the modest development of its political strength is appropriate to the Japanese national interest in a world

dominated by nuclear weapons. He sets forth a concept of what he calls the "moratorium world" and of Japan as a "moratorium state" (moratoriumu kokka). He describes world politics as in a state of transition from the traditional international order (the Westphalian system), in which the status of nation-states was established according to their military power, to what he calls a Kantian, peaceful world order in which the security of states will be preserved by a collective international arrangement. This transition stage is marked by a nuclear stand-off or parity between the superpowers which has created a power moratorium in the world. As a consequence, military power counts for less in determining the hierarchy of nations; international economic strength and technological know-how count for more. In other words, in this "moratorium world," there is no longer a single agreed-upon measure of status among nations: one state may have great military power; another may have great economic strength, and there is no reason that the status of a state must be congruent in all attributes.

Therefore, the incongruity between Japan's economic power and political-military weakness is not odd, but rather reflects the nature of this new situation in international society. Demands upon Japan to maintain a military establishment consistent with its economic standing, writes Nagai, reflect a projection onto the world community of a drive in Western society to achieve consistency in personal status. Japanese, however, are accustomed to inconsistency of status (chi no hiikkansei), as shown by the Tokugawa system when samurai had political power and prestige, while the merchants had economic power. In a passage reminiscent of Amaya's thesis, Nagai quotes Yamaga Soko (1622-1685): "Samurai live by honor, while farmers, artisans, and merchants live by

interest." Moreover, among the samurai, there was devised a complex allocation of different roles. For example, among the feudal lords the tozama were given great territorial domains, but no place in the central government; the fudai had administrative power but little territory. The purpose of this complex system was "to prevent the centralization of power by the drive to achieve consistency of status, which is a weakness of all men." What is necessary for the advancement of human society is the "globalization of the Tokugawa system," by which Nagai appears to envision a complex system of checks and balances in which different nations fulfill different roles.

The future of Japan, for Nagai, is as a "moratorium state." That is, in light of the present condition of international politics, Japan should preserve its present constitution and "maintain the inconsistency in its status as a lightly-armed, non-nuclear economic power." Strategic planning should concentrate on a limited but highly sophisticated defense posture, depending on advanced high technology such as lasers, precision-guided missiles, radar, and the like. Diplomacy should preserve the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and seek economic cooperation with the Soviet Union so that the latter has no cause for hostilities against Japan. Should the United States increase its pressure on Japan, presumably on economic or defense issues, or should the Soviet Union build up its power unduly in the Far East, Japan always has the potential threat of a nationalist response: revision of the constitution, conversion of its industry and technology to building arms, development of nuclear weapons, and so on. This threat gives Japan bargaining power to preserve its posture.

Nagai, who was a student of Maruyama Masao and has progressive ties, has something in common with the progressive approach. He seeks to preserve Article 9 and he believes Japan will "refuse to ever again become a state in the traditional sense." At one point in his essay, he writes that "Japan's 'grand experiment' could well become the military model for the industrially advanced democratic countries of the world." He believes the world is moving toward a peaceful world order. All of these positions give him something in common with the progressives. Nevertheless, he clearly does not believe that Japan can survive as a lightly-armed state without a shrewd strategy that comes to grips with power politics and the competition among nations. In this awareness, he shares the concept of the political realist approach. He differs from the latter, however, in his evident lack of commitment to Western liberal values as a cause for allying with the United States and Europe. In Nagai's view, the Japanese state stands for no values; it is a neutral entity. In fact, he worries, as do Kosaka and Amaya, that lacking any moral principles to guide them, but instead relying simply on the shrewd pragmatism and expediencies of the elites the Japanese people may not be able to maintain their spiritual morale. Concern over nationalism is a continuing preoccupation of the elite leadership that seeks to adhere to the Yoshida Doctrine. Its emergence could undermine the leadership and control the elites have exercised over Japan's course. Reflecting the sensitivity of the political realists to domestic opinion, Nagai has constructed a diagram of the correlation of forces which he frequently refers to in his writings. (See Figure 1)

The differences between political realism and military realism within the elites are epitomized in the debates between Nagai and

Okazaki Hisahiko that have taken place in the popular magazines. They have commented extensively on each other's views and in 1984 they engaged in a debate on the topic "What is Strategic Realism?" which was published in the July 1984 Chuo koron. Okazaki argued that postwar Japan has lacked any strategic doctrines, a situation that was no longer tenable given Soviet-American parity and the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia and the Pacific. Nagai responded that the Yoshida Doctrine has been and will continue to be Japan's strategic doctrine.* Okazaki, who sees Nagai's views as an unworkable compromise between progressivism and the reality of Japan's defense needs, described the moratorium state approach as avoiding to the extent possible the fulfillment of international obligations and burdens, maintaining during a grace period a vague and unclear position while gambling on the establishment in the future of a new international order. Dismissing the notion of the Japanese state as a neutral entity, Okazaki holds that Japan shares not only common strategic concerns with the Western democracies but also common values. Japan therefore should make common cause with the Western community of nations.⁴⁵

This debate over national strategy has focused on two groups of realists and goes on at the very heart of the elite leadership in Japan.

*In an interesting exchange in their debate Nagai insisted that just as Marx might not today be a Marxist, so it did not matter whether Yoshida was conscious of authoring a strategic doctrine:

- Nagai: "I call this [grand strategy] the 'Yoshida Doctrine.' Mr. Pyle of the University of Washington also uses the same term."
- Okazaki: "Yes, but Mr. Pyle clearly states in his writing that Yoshida himself declared that there was no such thing."
- Nagai: "That makes no difference.... What Yoshida Shigeru really thought has absolutely no relation to the 'Yoshida Doctrine.'"

Each group has strong forces behind it. The political realists, who are heirs to the Yoshida Doctrine and to the vision of Japan as a merchant state, draw their support from the most powerful elites in the Japanese political system--the mainstream of the LDP, the Ministry of Finance, MITI, the Economic Planning Agency, and leading financial circles. The military realists have the support of the anti-mainstream, right-wing LDP and in the course of the debate have gathered impressive new strength. In order to protect the American alliance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has moved squarely into support of the military realist position. The Defense Agency has become more vocal and determined in pursuing its case within the party and the government. Prime Minister Nakasone has given this position a national voice and Okazaki perceives a growing public consensus in behalf of a more forthright defense policy.

VII. The Rise of a New Nationalism

The rise of a new nationalism in the 1980s is in marked contrast to the nationalism of the 1930s. Above all, it is formless, free floating, and disembodied. It is not an organized movement, sponsored and shaped from above by the bureaucracy. To the contrary, it has arisen from below, as it were, in spite of the wishes of the elite. It is more a mood than a movement. It is a more forward-looking nationalism, less narrow, xenophobic and inward looking, less based on old values. It is more urban, cosmopolitan and middle class. It does not grow out of inferiority, of resentment at being behind the West in the production of modern science and technology, or at being influenced by the values and institutions of another culture.

The new nationalism grows out of pride in Japanese achievements, the international acclaim they have brought, and self-confidence in the prospects for the future. Like the proponents of military realism, the new nationalists have great sensitivity to the growing dangers of Japan's military environment and the threat represented by the Soviet buildup, but more important is the popular mood of self-confidence that emerged in the 1970s owing to a sense of having caught up with and overtaken the West. The dominant theme of modern Japanese history since the middle of the 19th century has been the national determination to gain equality with Western countries. We cannot over-estimate how profound and all-consuming this goal has been. To "catch up," the Japanese had to borrow wholesale large quantities of knowledge and institutions from Western countries to replace the inherited wisdom and values of their own culture. To the Japanese with their culturally ingrained sense of hierarchy and status this was a demeaning condition

that created a peculiar sense of inferiority and resentment toward the West. A key theme in modern Japanese history has been the search for ways to reconcile the conflicting needs of cultural borrowing and national pride, to be both modern and Japanese.

Above all else, then, the present mood of national pride--some would say, arrogance--should be understood as the immense self-satisfaction derived from having achieved the national goal of the past 120 years. In the judgment of a chorus of contemporary observers, it is a nation that has mastered the skills of organizing a modern industrial society with greater success than any other people, causing a Harvard sociologist in a runaway Japanese best seller to rate it simply "Number One" in the world. A spate of books followed, exploring the marvels of Japanese management techniques. The cooperation of government, business, and labor and the role of Japanese industrial policy, became the subject of intense scrutiny.

Foreign praise contributed immeasurably to the new mood. The Times of London, on July 21, 1980, called Japan "the world's leading industrialized nation." The popular French writer, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, in his book The World Challenge (1981) asserted that "Japan stands as a model to the world." In its May 20, 1982 issue Nature, a British scientific journal, published statistics purporting to show that Japanese school children score higher on standardized intelligence tests than school children of other nationalities and that the gap was steadily growing. Elsewhere, there were warnings that mastery of artificial intelligence would allow the Japanese further to outdistance all other peoples. A book published in 1983, The Fifth Generation: Artificial Intelligence and Japan's Computer Challenge to the World,

discussed Japan's ten-year program to develop artificial intelligence machines and concluded: "The nation that controls them could control world power. Will it be Japan?" It was not only in the Western world that the chorus of praise was sung--but even in other parts of Asia where Yoshida and his successors had been most at pains to reestablish Japanese credibility. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew held up Japan as a model of Confucian style cooperation for the common national welfare. Similarly, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir enunciated a national campaign to "Look East," pointing out that the Western countries had grown "lazy" and self-indulgent and calling on Malaysians to take Japan as a model.

In Japan, the surge of self-confidence is evidenced by the veritable tide of success literature that floods the bookstores. Scores of books have been written about the reasons for Japanese economic success; and their common theme is an emphasis on the unique characteristics of the Japanese people and their culture. Japan has outstripped the economic performance of other industrial countries, goes the usual explanation, because its historically-formed institutions have proved more productive and competitive than those of all other countries. More than one writer drew the irresistible conclusion. Wrote one widely-read economist, Iida Tsuneo, who subsequently toned down his remarks: "Is it not possible that Japan might be quite different from other countries? Is it not possible that Japan might be quite superior to other countries (yohodo sugurete iru)?"⁴⁶ Prime Minister Nakasone caught the national mood when he declared in January 1983, that "having 'caught up,' we must now expect others to try to catch up with us."⁴⁷

The November 17, 1984 Asahi Shimbun reported that the majority of Japanese now regard themselves as superior to Westerners. This conclusion was based on the survey of Japanese National Character that the Japanese Government has conducted at five-year intervals since 1953. The Asahi, announcing the results of the 1983 survey, observed that one of the most striking changes of attitude over the thirty years since the first survey was the response to the question: "Compared to Westerners, do you think, in a word, that the Japanese are superior? Or do you think they are inferior?" In 1953, 20% answered that the Japanese were superior. In 1983, 53% answered that the Japanese were superior. (A substantial percentage, not announced, said there was no difference; a small number said the Japanese were inferior or gave some other answer.) A Japanese professor has recently been critical of the Government for asking questions implying national and racial superiority which, he says, contravene the "international spirit" for which Japan should be striving.

The same survey showed a remarkable resurgence of confidence in Japan's traditional values. However providential the conditions under which the Yoshida Doctrine had been pursued, the success of high-growth policies is most often attributed to unique features in their own cultural endowment. Japanese began to regain trust in their own abilities and the success of books by foreigners praising their achievements and analyzing the distinctiveness of their industrial organization encouraged the trend toward cultural explanations of the Japanese success.

During the early postwar period, Japanese embraced the universalist pretensions of the new institutions established by the

Occupation. Dominant opinion held that prewar nationalism, which had been built on extraordinary claims of the collectivist ethic, the Japanese family-state, and the emperor system, had led them astray. Particularism had blinded them to their real self-interest, had overcome their best instincts, and had reduced them to international outcasts. How better to redeem themselves in the eyes of the world than by turning their backs on the particular claims of Japanese nationality and proclaiming themselves citizens of the world! To the extent that Japanese institutions and values diverged from the Western pattern, they were seen as somehow abnormal, distorted, unhealthy, and premodern. If Japan was to recover and develop into a modern, democratic, and progressive industrial society, it must eliminate these values and institutions, and follow the path of the liberal-democratic nations of the West.

By the 1980s, however, history was turned on its head. Japan's traditional values--in some respects they were the very ones which had been rejected in 1945 as a source of national weakness and shame--were now acclaimed not only by commentators in Japan, but, perhaps even more important to the Japanese, by foreign observers as Japan's unique advantage in building an advanced industrial society. No people can for long be satisfied to reject wholly the cultural heritage that is the legacy of their ancestors and the source of their amour propre. Accordingly, given such economic success and acclaim for its cultural basis and the unmistakable signs that the stigma of the war years had been outlived and past sins atoned for, it was not surprising that the Japanese mood changed.

These new attitudes toward the West have developed during the last two decades as Japan's economic progress has become apparent. As early as 1967 in an article entitled "Europe and Japan" by Umesao Tadao of Kyoto University, Europe was described as an object for sightseeing but no longer useful as a model. Umesao wrote of the "relative decline in status of the European countries in the postwar world" and held that "we are either moving shoulder to shoulder with Europe or are already out in front." He concluded that "Japanese today cannot fail to perceive the bankruptcy of Europe."⁴⁸ By the late 1970s, there was widespread discussion in Japanese periodicals of Eikokubyo (the British disease) which one writer in Shokun referred to as "a social disease which, upon the advancement of welfare programs, causes a diminished will to work, over-emphasis on rights, and declining productivity."⁴⁹ Nor was the United States by any means exempt from such patronizing attitudes. After Vietnam, Watergate, and the seizure of American hostages in Iran, it was not infrequent to find discussion of "America's fading glory." As an editorial writer, Matsuyama Yukio, for the Asahi Shinbun wrote, "Watching the United States suddenly losing its magnificence is like watching a former lover's beauty wither away. It makes me want to cover my eyes."⁵⁰ Articles about the "American disease" also appeared, particularly in light of the conquering of the American automobile industry. The "American disease" referred to a wasteful, inefficient society, bereft of its work ethic, no longer able to maintain the quality of its goods, crime- and divorce-ridden, suffering social disintegration. One Japanese journalist observed in December 1980, that there had formed "an image in the Japanese mind of the United States as being hopeless....Put sarcastically, the reason half a million copies of

Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One have been sold in Japan is that the book captures the psychology underlying the negative image of the United States and appeals to the Japanese sense of superiority."⁵¹

There is a pervasive conviction that Japan has caught up not only in a material sense but in the fulfillment of social and political values as well. Furthermore, there is confidence that these goals have been reached by a Japanese--a better--cultural route. Goals of Western liberalism have been realized without the social costs apparent in the West because they have been reached by relying on Japanese cultural values and patterns of behavior. We can illustrate this attitude best by looking at the views of a popular economic writer, Iida Tsuneo, who observes:

The nature of the Japanese economy is such that, in comparison to the United States and Europe, it better observes the spirit embodied in modern economics and more effectively functions in accordance with the principles of Neo-classical economic theory. In a broader perspective, one can say that the national characteristic of Japan, in comparison to the West, is to pursue more seriously such bourgeois democratic values as liberty, equality, and (respect for) the individual, and to realize these goals on a wider, more effective scale. In short, the basic character of Japan consists of purified strains (junsui baiyo) of the West.⁵²

In other words, out of the chrysalis of Japanese culture has come the purest expression of modern Western values. Japan's achievement is not simply a material one of outstripping the economic growth and per capita GNP of Western societies, but of actually fulfilling the most cherished aspirations of Western civilization. Writes Iida:

Generally speaking, then, in terms of achieving the ideals of democracy, egalitarianism, and individualism and in maintaining a competitive (economic) mechanism, Japan may appear to be an ordinary nation. But this "ordinariness" is only in appearance. The fact of the matter is that

what are "principles" (tatema) in the Western nations have become "reality" (honne) in Japan.⁵³

In such a view, Japan's national character is more "Western" or "modern" than the prewar conception which was fundamentally based on the formula of merging "Western science and Japanese values." Iida concludes:

As is often said, Japan relies on the West for the principles of science and technology. But, in making improvements on, and in adapting (the imported science and technology), Japan often excels the West. Since this is the case with science and technology, there is nothing surprising about the fact that similar feats are being accomplished in the economic and social arenas.⁵⁴

Above all, it is felt that Japan has a leg up on other countries in the progress toward the new high-technology oriented society. In the words of Takeuchi Hiroshi, a prominent bank economist, "both Japanese society and the organization of Japanese firms contain powerful built-in stimuli toward technological innovation."⁵⁵ In other words, the Japanese economy behaves in a unique and superior fashion owing to distinctive cultural patterns inherent in Japanese society. For example, former MITI Councilor Amaya stresses the formation of "collegial groups" (nakama shudan) within the Japanese economy. These groups embrace a firm, its employees, other firms with which it does business, its sub-contractors, and its bank. Holding these groups together is a sense of internal solidarity rooted in values of harmony that originated in the traditional village. Amaya holds that these groups are therefore a combination of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft elements.

Such Gemeinschaft-like interpersonal relationships are not only between a firm and its employees. They also exist between one firm and others with which it has business relationships, and between a firm and its banks. These inter-firm relationships are not cold,

profit-loss relationships based on calculations and contracts, but cohesive relationships which have a large margin for emotion and sense of obligation.⁵⁶

Within the Japanese economy, Amaya contends, there is among these groups an intense competition unknown in the West. That is because the struggles go far beyond the bounds of seeking only profit; they seek the prestige of larger market shares. Owing to the collegial nature of relationships, employees are willing to sacrifice for "their company," subcontractors will absorb losses, and banks will allow "over-borrowing" to facilitate expansion. Anti-trust regulation to preserve competition is necessary in Western societies because they do not have the cultural forces that promote a fierce and excessive competition (kato-kyoso). This fierce competition among firms, says economist Takeuchi, is one reason for the speed of technological progress in Japan. "No one in the world today," writes Moritani, the senior researcher at Nomura Research Institute, "has made the principle of free competition work to the advantage of corporate activity and the development of new technology better than Japan."⁵⁷

This national mood of self-congratulation and pride is widespread and pervasive. One of the most popular television personalities, Takemura Kenichi, whose talk show has a mass audience, reflects this mood in his views. For example, he speaks with admiration of Nakagawa Yatsuhiro whose tone of braggadocio is remarkable. In words of praise for Nakagawa's 1982 book, Japan as a Welfare Superpower (Cho-fukushi Okoku Nippon), Takemura describes the author as "an opinion leader who represents Japan of the 1980s."⁵⁸ Nakagawa's prolific writings are characterized by a boldness and bombast that appeal to a mass audience. Demanding that Japan play "a positive role on the world stage," he calls

Japan, in the title of another recent book "the ultra-advanced country" (Cho-senshin koku Nippon).⁵⁹ For some years a bureaucrat and at one time Deputy Director of the Nuclear Fuel Division of the Science and Technology Agency, Nakagawa typifies the facile young writer that has gained attention in the general-interest magazines. He is scornful of the intellectuals who had hitherto dominated these magazines and whom he dismisses as "vendors of imported merchandise."⁶⁰ Unable to free themselves of Japan's traditional awe of Western countries, these intellectuals have failed to acknowledge that "Japan is the leading nation in the world in terms of the provisions that it makes for the welfare of its citizens and in terms of the abundance and affluence that its citizens enjoy in their daily lives." By his calculations, the average Japanese worker in 1978 had an after-tax income at least 1.4 times to 2.0 times what his American counterpart earned. Nakagawa stresses the role of the bureaucracy in promoting the livelihood of the people because he wants to reverse the distrust of the Japanese state that has prevailed since 1945. He argues that MITI, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and other government agencies are devoted to the Japanese workers' welfare. In fact, "in everything but name, Japan has turned itself into a textbook example of a socialist country." In describing Japan as "the worker's paradise," Nakagawa considers welfare payments, income, health care, diet, housing, and education. In these categories, he contends that Japan has outstripped Western countries and has done this without high taxes and in an extraordinarily egalitarian setting.

This mood of inflated national pride in Japan's social and economic achievements has given rise to a strident new nationalism that

advocates building a political and military power commensurate with Japan's economic strength. The new nationalists not only deride the political realists and their Yoshida doctrine, they part company with the military realists by urging an autonomous Japanese strategic role in international politics. Without doubt, the most strident and widely discussed new nationalist is the sociologist Shimizu Ikutaro whose sensational book, Nippon yo, kokka tare: kaku o sentaku (Japan, Become a State: Exercise the Nuclear Option!), published in 1980, seized on this national mood of self-pride and sought to turn it in a political direction. The new nationalists reject continued reliance on Japan's extraordinary and peculiar international status; they reject important aspects of the postwar order and, in sharp contrast with the military realists they do not stress a shared community of interests and values with the Western democracies that would impel them to cooperate in an alliance framework. In this they are more akin to the economic nationalism of the mercantilist school. As Shimizu Ikutaro wrote in his widely read Nippon yo, kokka tare, "On the one hand, Japan must encourage friendly relations with America, the Soviet Union, and all other countries, but at the same time we must not forget for an instant that Japan is alone. In the end we can only rely on Japan and the Japanese."⁶¹ Shimizu, observing the decline in American power and world commitment, believes that Japan cannot rely on the American deterrent in an emergency. As a consequence, the nationalists seek more than a modest build-up of arms. "If Japan acquired military power commensurate with its economic power," wrote Shimizu, "countries that fully appreciate the meaning of military power would not overlook this. They

would defer; they would act with caution; and in time they would show respect." The time had arrived for Japan to fulfill its potential:

When Japan breaks down its postwar illusions and taboos and develops military power commensurate with its economic strength, significant political power will naturally be born. In its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and many countries in many degrees and meanings, Japan will gain a free hand. Even though it be alone, if it exercises its political power wisely Japan will gain friends that will respect it and that will readily come to its aid. With its combined economic, military, and political power, won't Japan be a proud superpower (dodo taru tai-koku)! While splendidly possessing the qualities to be a super-power, Japan, whether out of inertia or lack of courage, is behaving like a physically handicapped person right in plain view of the world.⁶²

Pressing on relentlessly to his most dramatic point, Shimizu observes that the nuclear powers, "even though they do not use their weapons, are able to instill fear in those countries that do not have them. A country like Japan that does not possess nuclear weapons and is afraid of them will be easy game for the nuclear powers. Putting political pressure on Japan would be like twisting a baby's arm."⁶³ Japan, in short, must "exercise the nuclear option."

The second half of Shimizu's book contains a report by an anonymous Military Science Research Group (Gunji kagaku kenkyukai) which has been described by Professor Otake as reflecting the professional military perspective of the Japan Self Defense Forces.⁶⁴ Questioning the reliability of the American deterrent, the report calls for a massive buildup of offensive power that would include nuclear weapons, four carrier task forces, 17 escort flotillas, 300 tactical bombers, 350 F-15s, 200-300 tanks--in short a vastly expanded military force that would project Japanese power throughout the region of East Asia and the Pacific.

Shimizu's book sent a shudder through the mainstream LDP elites, for his view represents the very nationalism that they most fear will gain popular backing and weaken their control of policy direction. Shimizu's views do have strong backing among the constituencies that support the right wing of the LDP, most notably for example the young local business leaders who make up the Japan Junior Chamber of Commerce. But still more important, it was feared that Shimizu's views portended a major shift and recomposition of domestic opinion for he had been a leading theoretician of the progressives and a prominent leader of the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations in 1960. Inoki Masamichi wrote plaintively that Shimizu's conversion threatened to confirm his worst fears: the "utopian pacifism" of postwar Japan might give way to "utopian militarism."⁶⁵

Similarly, Nagai Yonosuke said in his 1984 debate with Okazaki, "At a glance it would seem not to be so, but in postwar Japan nationalism is extremely strong. The left wing is really nationalist. To turn from the left to the right like Shimizu Ikutaro is extremely easy. Japan is fundamentally nationalist and the quest for autonomy is strong."⁶⁶ In his 1985 book Strategy and the Modern Age, Nagai explains how such a shift of opinion might take place. Pointing out that the Japanese left has always had a nationalist dimension in its anti-American overtones and its desire to be independent of the American security guarantee, Nagai holds that labor shows a strong potential for nationalism. The Democratic Socialist Party, which he regards as close to the right wing of the LDP in many respects, draws support for example from the Shipbuilders Union who strongly favor the military realist and nationalist points of view. DSP Diet members who are from the

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Union strongly support arms exports, defense consciousness, and nationalism. Likewise, the rightward drift of the JSP under Ishibashi's leadership could bring it into a coalition government. The left wing idealism could be tempered by exercise of power, and labor if faced with structural depression could come to favor support of arms spending as is the case among unions in Western countries. In addition the Komeito, with its support base among the alienated and struggling urban lower middle class has, Nagai feels, a potential for support of nationalist values, particularly in a time of economic hardship.⁶⁷

The new nationalists confront directly and insistently the contradictions and incongruities that characterize Japan's postwar order; and they advocate clear and decisive solutions that touch deep and ambivalent emotions among many Japanese. Shimizu described Japan as a "peculiar" and "abnormal" country (ijo na kuni).⁶⁸ It had lived for decades under a constitutional order forced on it by occupying military forces. It had abnegated the essential characteristics of a nation-state which were military power and the required loyalty of its citizenry. Other nations had lost a war, but where was there another that had wholly lost its national consciousness? "The overwhelming view among intellectual circles, the media, educators, and so on, is that the state, the people, and the military are more than dangerous; they are unclean."⁶⁹ These progressives, he said, do not make the same judgment of other countries. To exist, Japan depends on resources, food, and markets around the world, but it refuses to ensure the security of its maritime transport routes. It depends on the good will of other countries and idealizes the United Nations, an organization formed by

the powers that defeated Japan. Japan is the third largest contributor to the United Nations but it is still not one of the permanent members of the Security Council--which are all nuclear powers.

The nationalists point out ways in which the renunciation of military power has distorted national life. Katsuda Kichitaro, a professor of political thought at Kyoto University, writing in the September 1984 issue of Seiron derides postwar Japan as a "Peter Pan state" and as an "effeminate state," lacking the will to defend its own liberties. He is contemptuous of the "Yoshida style 'merchant state'." By relinquishing military strength, Japan in fact ceased to be a state and, instead, became simply a society whose essence is economic activities. Katsuda, in his book Heiwa kenpo o utagau (Doubts about the Peace Constitution), observed that the postwar liberal constitutional order, in reaction to wartime nationalism, lost sight of a concept of the state to which citizens owe their loyalty so that it can maintain order and protect the welfare of the whole community. Instead he wrote, it is the business firms who can call on their employees for the ultimate sacrifice. When a director of Nissho-Iwai was implicated in a recent scandal involving the Grumman Corporation, he took his own life, leaving behind a note: "The company is eternal. Employees must die for the company."⁷⁰ An incident cited by Katsuda and other critics as illustrating the disgraceful weakness of the postwar state is the hijacking by the radical group known as the Japanese Red Army of a Japan Air Lines jet in 1977. The government wholly capitulated, paying the \$6 million ransom, releasing several terrorists from jail as demanded by the hijackers and justifying its action by proclaiming that "a single human life is weightier than the earth."⁷¹

Shimizu and Katsuda were among ten nationalists who took the lead in forming in 1982 "The Committee of One Hundred to Revise the Japan-United States Security Treaty" which declared in its founding statement that to continue indefinitely the present Security Treaty which puts Japan in the position of an American protectorate does great injury to the national pride of us Japanese."⁷² Saying that the Constitution and the Security Treaty are no longer appropriate to the new international conditions, it called for revision of the Security Treaty to make it genuinely reciprocal and to permit a much greater Japanese defense establishment which would greatly strengthen the Japanese-American alliance. The statement was signed by 191 prominent political, business, cultural and academic leaders. Included were 58 LDP Diet members principally from the Tanaka (20), Fukuda (14), Nakagawa (9) and Nakasone (6) factions. This represented about one-seventh of the LDP members of both Houses. Although the tone was strongly nationalist there were among the signers what we have called military realists. The nationalists, for their part, ultimately favor an autonomous Japanese strategic role, but evidently saw a greater reciprocity in the alliance as an acceptable first step. Perhaps the Committee's position represented a compromise between the military realist and nationalist positions. It was, says Nagai Yonosuke, "a mixed group."⁷³

It was inevitable that an assertive nationalist reassessment of the Occupation's reforms and its view of modern Japanese history would take place. The Allies' view of Japan's guilt was so simple and overdrawn, its view of Japanese leaders and their intentions so set in black-and-white terms, its reforms so determinedly American and universalist, that the Japanese were left without pride or respect for

their modern history. No people can for long be satisfied to reject wholly the cultural heritage that is the legacy of their ancestors and the source of their amour propre. The controversy in 1982 over the revision of high school social science texts was the occasion for much nationalist reflection on the postwar condemnation of Japan's modern history. The Japanese Government's apologies to the governments of China and South Korea angered nationalists who said it was demeaning to Japan to allow foreign governments to influence how its own history was taught. A strong campaign has been mounted in Shokun and other nationalist-leaning journals against the left-wing press, particularly the Asahi, criticizing its obsequiousness toward China, its leftist bias, and "its failure to report serious news events that do not square with its ideological tendencies."⁷⁴

Revisionist views with a strong nationalist flavor of the history of the coming of the Pacific War and of the Occupation have become current. Two movies released in 1983, Toei's popular Dai Nippon teikoku (The Empire of Great Japan), which glosses over Japanese responsibility for the war, and the documentary Tokyo saiban (The Tokyo Trials), which questions the fairness of the war crimes trials, are indicative of the popularity of the new point of view. There is much sympathy, judging from references seen by this author to the book Dai Toa senso kotei ron (In Affirmation of the Greater East Asia War) which first appeared as a series of articles in the mid-1960s by the novelist Hayashi Fusao who sees the war as the culmination of a century-long struggle, led by Japan, of the Asian peoples against Western imperialism. There is an anti-American undertone running through much of this writing. The Pacific War is seen as forced upon Japan by the desperate circumstances

of the oil embargo, in the short run, and by the struggle for survival against Western imperialist encroachment in Asia, in the long run. In some authors' views, the Occupation and the Constitution are described as an effort to weaken and permanently subjugate Japan.

As an inevitable outgrowth of this mood, there is a pervasive and intense reassessment and critical evaluation of the postwar reforms imposed by the American Occupation and the value system which then took root. The public statement of the Justice Minister, Okuno Seisuke, in the autumn of 1980, that the Constitution was imposed on Japan when it "had no sovereignty" and that it was desirable to discuss enactment of an independently written constitution, was one of the recent occurrences calling attention to this newly critical mood toward the postwar system. Similarly, the visit of successive prime ministers and most of their cabinet members to Yasukuni Shrine, which had been the state shrine for the war dead since Meiji times, implicitly affronts the strict separation of politics and religion laid down in the Constitution. According to a survey by the Asahi Shinbun, published November 4, 1980, two-thirds of the members of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the Diet were inclined to favor revision of the Constitution.

Many writers, of whom the critic Eto Jun is the most notable, are scrutinizing the procedures followed in drafting and imposing the Constitution. They emphasize the censorship, the manipulation of popular opinion, and the alien and utopian nature of its provisions. The result was a constitutional system that deprived Japan of sovereign rights fundamental to a nation-state. "The basic goal of American Occupation policy," writes Eto, "was to destroy the Greater Japanese Empire which had styled itself as 'unparalleled among nations' (bankoku

muhi), and to create an ordinary Japan. Ironically, the Occupation gave birth to a Japan which is, in an entirely different sense, 'unparalleled among nations.'" Without the "right of belligerency," which was renounced in Article 9, Japan could not be a free, sovereign nation, master of its own fate.⁷⁵ Yoshida accepted this status and built Japan's postwar system to suit it. Eto wrote in the September 1983 Seiron that "so long as we continue to set up Yoshida politics as the legitimate conservative politics, we Japanese will not escape from the shackles of the postwar period and the road to self-recovery will be closed."⁷⁶ Since the 1960s, the Government has shelved the constitutional issue, concentrated on economic development, and offered flexible interpretations of the Constitution as the need arose. Eto maintains that a tacit understanding exists between the conservatives and the progressives to leave the issue unresolved. But the time has come, he argues, to confront the issue and restore Japan's "right of belligerency" so that Japan could prepare to defend itself should the need arise. Americans, for their part, Eto writes, must face up to the new situation, as well. They must admit that Article 9 was a result of their distrust of Japan and their fear that Japan might some day again attack the United States. "If there were among the American people the determination to wipe away completely their distrust of Japan, to tolerate a more powerful and less dependent Japan and to form an alliance with and coexist with such a Japan, then the future of Japan-U.S. relations would indeed be bright."⁷⁷

What is the social basis of the new nationalism? From what groups in society does it draw its strength? What access does it have to power? I have argued that fundamentally the new nationalism is

reflective of a popular mood brought on by economic success, mounting trade frictions, the relative decline of American power, and increased consciousness of the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia and the Pacific. On the whole, this sentiment is disembodied, formless, and free floating in that it is widely felt in many sectors of society and is not the product of specific groups and is not simply limited to a particular organized movement.

We have seen that the new nationalists have not been at the heart of the strategic debate because their demands for constitutional revision and a massive buildup that would give Japan an autonomous deterrent capability were regarded as too extreme among the elite leaders of Japanese society. Nevertheless, there are particular groups that give a clearly defined support to the nationalists and on the right wing it is accurate to speak of a nationalist movement.

There is substantial support and sympathy for this new nationalism in many parts of the business community which saw an efflorescence of nationalism in the early 1980s. In his study of business leaders' attitudes, Professor Otake found a strong sense that Japan should be responsible for its own defense, that it was necessary to promote patriotism and defense-consciousness among the young through a "spiritual education."⁷⁸ Particularly among younger executives, as we shall discuss later, nationalism has very strong appeal. Among the shipbuilders, owing to their hard times, and other executives there is support for arms production and export, but in general the businessmen's nationalism stops short of abandoning the Three Principles of Arms Exports. As Doko Toshio, the respected president of Keidanren, said, "We have lots of other goods to export besides weapons;" and furthermore

"if we are criticized when we export cars, what would it be like if we exported weapons?"⁷⁹ Otake concludes, however, that if there were a substantial economic downturn there is a strong possibility that restraints on arms export and production would disappear.

We have already discussed the sympathy for nationalism within parts of the labor movement that Nagai Yonosuke has discerned and the danger that he perceives in the new policies of Ishibashi which open up the possibilities of coalition government. The kind of nationalist attitude that the Shipbuilders Union has demonstrated, he perceives, could spread to other sections of labor movement.

Both Nagai and Otake feel there is considerable potential for nationalism among the supporters of the Komeito.⁸⁰ Its social basis, they point out, is similar to "the classic bearers of fascism," because it is composed of lower income people coming to the cities from the countryside, people of limited education, alienated city dwellers, the managers of middle and small industry in the local regions, those in night-time (mizu-shobai) industries. While progressivism and pacifism are still strong among the Komeito support base, the party leadership wants to remain middle-of-the-road and thus there has been a notable rightward drift in recent years.

Since the war--or more accurately since the end of the Occupation--there has been a residue of right wing groups, survivors of the prewar years, which have a history of violence and underworld ties. They have been associated with recurrent violent and sometimes bizarre episodes such as the assassination of the Socialist Party leader Asanuma or the suicide of Mishima. During the 1970s the number of rightist organizations, according to police records, increased from about 500 to

700.⁸¹ Their total membership remained stable at about 120,000. The majority of the groups have membership of less than 50. The vast majority are in the big cities. During the 1970s and early 1980s there was a fairly steady increase in the number of legal violations involving rightist groups, ranging from assaults to traffic violations.⁸² A favorite target is the left wing Japan Teachers Union and particularly its annual meeting which always occasions right wing activities including demonstrations, assaults, and often bullying of businesses serving the meeting.

But there is also a new trend sometimes referred to as "the emergence of the new right." Its name originates from several factors: its opposition to the "new left" student groups that disrupted campuses in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its criticism of the violence and gang tactics of the "old right," and its espousal and use of new strategies of grass roots political action and mobilization.⁸³

The closest thing we have to a genuine new nationalist movement in Japan today--as we have said much of the new nationalism is best described as a mood--is the joint activity of several religious groups and related right wing organizations, notably Seicho no ie (The House of Growth), a sect with a considerable background of nationalist advocacy.⁸⁴ Seicho no ie, which claims 3,000,000 members, is one of the so-called "new religions." Founded in 1930 it is vaguely syncretic in its teachings which give emphasis to spiritualism, striving for individual perfection, a belief in the godliness common to all religions. It cannot be dismissed or categorized simply as the belief of a naive lower class: the president of one of Japan's most dynamic

high-tech companies, Inamori Kazuo of Kyoto Ceramics (Kyocera) is an adherent.

The founder of the sect, Taniguchi Masaharu, who in a 1965 book, Kagiri naku Nippon o aisuru (Unlimited Love for Japan) idealized Japan's family system and advocated a Japanese style democracy based on the traditional values embodied in the Emperor system. In 1964 Seicho no ie formed a political arm which has grass roots organizations throughout the country and works with the right wing of the LDP. In contrast to the old right, it has sought to mobilize mass popular support at the local level for a clearly defined legislative agenda: 1) revision of the Constitution; 2) revision of the laws governing the Self-Defense Force; 3) an anti-espionage law; 4) establishment of Yasukuni Shrine as a national memorial to the war dead; 5) enhanced legal status for the national flag and national anthem.⁸⁵

Seicho no ie's successful campaign to persuade the Diet to pass a law to legalize the use of the era name, rather than the Western calendar, in recording dates (e.g. Showa 60, instead of 1985) was accomplished by mobilizing support at the local level and having each prefectural legislature (except for Okinawa) pass supporting resolutions. It worked with other religious groups such as the political arm of the Shinto sects, right wing and other nationalist groups to form a national organization to persuade the media and the political parties. The mass nature of the movement mounted by Seicho no ie eventually won the support not only of the right wing of the LDP but also the mainstream. Otake shows how Prime Minister Fukuda tried to build his reelection strategy in 1978 on the support of religious groups and their nationalist causes. In the end it failed and Ohira's more moderate

handling of nationalist issues such as legalization of the era name which passed the Diet in 1979 won the support of the moderate middle-of-the-road parties--the DSP and the Komeito.⁸⁶ This new nationalist movement recognizes the need for moderation to win broad support and for local level backing in order to command the attention of the central government. Following the success of the era name issue, Seicho no ie and the associated groups set about organizing other similar efforts such as the League to Establish an Independent Constitution, Jishu kempo kisei domei, which 280 LDP members joined, under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister Kishi, and the National Association to Defend Japan (Nippon o mamoru kokumin Kaigi). As the most recent authoritative study of the Japanese Right has concluded, these new nationalist groups realize that to raise extreme issues of rearmament, the emperor as head-of-state, and the passage of restrictions on civil rights will polarize the country. Therefore the new right is adopting a "soft" strategy, one that would overcome the people's "allergy" to revision of the Constitution by emphasizing flexibility and patience for a steady, step-by-step victory.⁸⁷

VIII. Nationalism and the Successor Generation

More than sixty per cent of the Japanese population today was born after World War Two and this is a noteworthy factor in the formation of attitudes towards the nation. There are four different political generations to be discerned on the political scene today:

- 1) the prewar generation, brought up and educated before the war;
- 2) the wartime generation, which came to maturity during the war years;
- 3) the postwar generation of the 1950s and 1960s; and 4) the present "high growth" generation. Each of these generations has distinctive concerns and perspectives toward the nation as a result of their historical experiences, which is not to say that they have a single clear view, but rather they have common concerns.

The prewar generation of Japanese generally born before 1920, whose education was completed by the 1930s, were shaped in the crucible of the prewar nation-state. They learned the importance of subordinating selfish concerns to the welfare of the family and the state. The Japanese struggle to "catch up" with the West and gain national equality and respect was an ingrained part of their world outlook. They have a strongly inbred sense of catch-up nationalism, and with it a strong sense of the traditional values of collectivism that were inculcated in a myriad of ways during the prewar period.

Shimizu Ikutaro (b. 1907) in many ways reflects the intellectual odyssey of this generation; for this reason he is often said to be a barometer of political change in Japan. As a brilliant student at the University of Tokyo in the 1920s he was drawn to the radicalism of campus political life, but in the 1930s underwent a "conversion" to nationalism after graduation. He became a member of Prime Minister

Konoe's brain trust, the Showa Kenkyukai, which helped provide the intellectual justification for Japanese militarism and expansionism. In the first decades after the War, he was one of the principal theoreticians for the progressives, exerting substantial influence over students and left-wing intellectuals. In 1960, he was a leading spokesman for the opposition to renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. Thereafter, his views began to change and he broke ranks with the progressives. In 1963, he urged abandonment of what he had come to regard as simplistic and negative ways that progressives viewed the past; and he called for a new interpretation of Japanese history:

The more I learn about the efforts of many countries of Asia and Africa to modernize, the more I appreciate the understanding and skill of the Japanese leaders and people who modernized our nation during the Meiji period. The modernization process through which Japan has gone now spans a century, and that process has obviously not been just a series of unrelated episodes. It has not been just an accumulation of crimes and evil acts that can be expiated by a democratic revolution, national independence and a socialist revolution, as claimed by the advocates of the progressive view of history. The history of the Japanese, just as the histories of all great peoples, represents a dynamic intertwining of wisdom, energy, evil and misfortune. I believe that a new interpretation of history, accurately reflecting that dynamism, will have to be based on hypotheses that grow out of a study of the modernization process through which Japan has gone.⁸⁸

In a recent book, Sengo o utagau (Doubts about the Postwar Period), Shimizu shows how far his views have evolved. He regards postwar educational reforms as wholly divorced from the life of the people and concludes that the values of the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education are still valid and appropriate.⁸⁹ He sees the premises that underlie postwar reforms as similar to Enlightenment thought. The postwar

reforms and their progressive adherents shared with the Enlightenment a worship of reason and of science and a contempt for history. They have, furthermore, shared the Enlightenment faith in the fundamental goodness of human nature: if institutions were reformed, human behavior would be changed.⁹⁰ Shimizu holds, in contrast, that institutions must be rooted in the lives of the common people and for this reason he rejects the universalist and alien nature of the postwar system.

Because of his former prominence as a leader of the progressive forces, Shimizu has been roundly excoriated for his apostasy. A close study of his earlier writings, however, reveals a notable continuity of certain themes. He has been concerned, both before and after his volte-face, with the thinking of the common man.⁹¹ From the outset of the postwar period he was preoccupied with the fundamental predicament and dilemma of the progressive adherents of the new order: democratic values and institutions were not the free choice of a free people; they were imposed by an occupying military authority. Like Maruyama Masao and others, he was keenly aware of the gap between the new institutions and the social values inherent in the peoples' everyday lives. "What are the Japanese?," he asked in 1951; "they are Asian."⁹² He emphasized the need to create a concept of democracy faithful to the values and daily experience of the Japanese people. Where others of the progressive persuasion sought the destruction of Japanese institutions and values as pre-modern remnants, Shimizu saw a need to root democracy in the behavior of the Japanese common man.⁹³

A second generation, whose distinct role has not been fully appreciated abroad but which has been increasingly vocal, is the so-called "wartime generation" (senchu ha). It came to maturity during the

war years and actually fought the war. As young men, its members were sent into the battles to die for the imperial cause. Not unlike the Vietnam veterans in recent American history, Japan's wartime generation was scarred by the stigma attached to the imperial cause during the postwar years. For decades they were quiet about their experiences and perspectives on the nation, but in the recent debates and reassessment of the war, this generation has become more vocal, particularly in discussing the relation of the individual and the nation and in criticizing the postwar materialism and the failure to formulate any sense of national purpose in the pursuit of economic ends. This generation sees itself as trying to create a bridge between the prewar devotion to the nation and the postwar commitment to private ends. It is worth noting that the new national political leadership is largely representative of this generation.

An example of the wartime generation's unique point of view which attracted much national attention is the writings of Yoshida Mitsuru, a survivor of the superbattleship Yamato which was sunk in the last months of the war.⁹⁴ His writings on the Yamato captured the national imagination because it had virtually a suicide mission. This enormous battleship was dispatched south with no air cover to meet the American attack on Okinawa. Yoshida was one of 200 surviving of the more than 3,000 officers and men aboard. Yoshida, a bank official now deceased, tells how he and others who were drafted into service doubted the imperial cause and knew the inevitable outcome but went into the battle out of obligation to the nation and to the people who had given them life. They came to feel that their mission was to lead the way to Japan's rebirth in which Japan would be restored to respect in the

international community and in which the state would respect the worth of individual Japanese. But in the postwar period as a reaction to the war the worth of the nation had been rejected and Japanese had retreated into self-gratification and the private pursuit of material gain. Yoshida saw this as a betrayal of his generation's mission. "High economic growth is not bad in itself; what is bad is that the Japanese have no sense of the ends to which they wish to apply the power brought about by high economic growth."

The wartime generation is dismayed by the postwar decline of the nation-state as an entity seen to be existing for the common good and therefore worthy of individual sacrifice. There is a tendency, Katsuda Kichitaro observes, "to write as if citizen and state were in an antagonistic relationship. In the final analysis, it is the erosion of the concept of the public that has occasioned this result."⁹⁵ As recent evidence of the lack of commitment to the common welfare, he cites a 1982 poll conducted by the National Student Newspaper Association which showed only 14% of student respondents willing to defend Japan by resort to arms if it were invaded.⁹⁶ In a passage characteristic of the wartime generation's desire to bridge the concerns of the prewar and postwar generations, Katsuda says that while he wants to restore the prewar sense of commitment to the national good, he does not wish to revive the Emperor system; he does wish to protect the human rights and liberal democracy of the postwar period, but a balance of concerns between the individual and the welfare of the entire people is required. Finally, it is also characteristic of the wartime generation that it retains a strong sense of Japan's vulnerability, of the fragility of

Japan's economy and its exposed geo-strategic position. Realism derives much of its support from this generation.

The postwar generation which grew up and was educated after the war is Japan's "successor generation" in the sense that its members will be moving into positions of responsibility during the remainder of this century. Their life experiences have been decisively different from the previous two generational groups and have given them a swelling self-confidence but a weak sense of Japanese identity. Having no memory of war, defeat, or occupation, they have come to maturity during Japan's "greenhouse period," a time when the nation has been sheltered in an artificial environment from the hurly-burly of international politics by the security relationship with the United States. There has been little intrusion of international politics to disrupt the complacency or to temper the optimism and self-assurance of this generation.

This generation has grown up during a time when Japan, free to concentrate its energies on economic development, has gone from success to success. It has been freer of the discipline and constraints ordinarily imposed by the parental generation because the latter's confidence in its own authority and values was undermined by the outcome of the war. As Yoshida Mitsuru wrote, his wartime generation had been quiet and non-assertive because of the stigma of shame that its members bore for participation in the national debacle. Instead the postwar generation was nurtured in an educational system where new values of individual rights and freedom were stressed.

To be sure there was the intense competition of the school system and the struggle for success in a profession to discipline the individual, but as a group the postwar generation had little sense of

constraints on what it was possible for them to achieve. The ebullience and arrogance of a facile young writer like Nakagawa Yatsuhiro (b. 1945) is typical of this self confidence. There is no goal that his Japan cannot achieve:

Japanese energy, as we see it devoted to this perpetual task of catching-up and overtaking the rest of the pack, is truly something to wonder at! Day after day, we Japanese shift our sights from one goal to another, always looking for the world's leader in any area, and then setting ourselves the task of doing him better at his own game.⁹⁷

Together with this self-confidence is a palpable anti-American undercurrent. Nakagawa, for example, writes patronizingly of the "plain and simple" life style of middle class Americans and takes pleasure in arguing how Japan has outstripped the world's leader. The young writer Ishikawa Yoshimi writing in March 1985 describes the United States as Japan's traditional adversary in a struggle for control of the Pacific. Japan should not acquiesce in Reagan's hope to reassert American hegemony and to bring Japan to its knees.⁹⁸

Such anti-Americanism is not new but has always been present in the postwar generation as a kind of hidden nationalism. The anti-Security Treaty struggle (Ampo) which the Zengakuren waged and the anti-Vietnam war movement of Beheiren and other student groups were, as the poet Ayukawa Nobuo recently wrote, "no more than simple anti-Americanism," a form of left-wing nationalism.⁹⁹ In fact, many Zengakuren leaders have radically changed their left-wing views shifting from opposition to support of the Security Treaty and the Self-Defense forces. Among the older members of this generation there are many dramatic examples. The present Director General of the Defense Agency, Kato Koichi, is one. Describing himself as "a member of the

Ampo generation," Kato (b. 1939) participated in anti-Treaty demonstrations at a time when his father was an LDP Diet member. In the March 1985 Bungei shunju he recalled his generation having several motivations at the time: distrust of the prewar politicians still in power, idealistic sympathy for China which the Americans opposed, and concern that the Treaty would involve Japan in war in Asia. The declaration by Chou En-lai in 1969 that the Security Treaty was a contribution to peace in Asia was an enormous shock, said Kato: "Thereafter support in Japan for the Treaty rapidly increased. And after the fall of South Vietnam debate over the Treaty virtually ceased and subsequently admiration for Yoshida Shigeru began." Other Zengakuren leaders have undergone similar changes. Koyama Ken'ichi, a member of the LDP brain trust and Nishibe Susumu, leader of what is sometimes called "new conservatism" are examples.

But most of this generation is still adrift. In the changed climate of opinion in Japan during the past seven or eight years there is clearly a ferment among the postwar generation in which the anti-American nationalism is taking on a more assertive form. Hasegawa Michiko (b. 1945) describes her generation as struggling to find a Japanese identity through reexamination of the meaning of the Pacific War: "Those of us born in the immediate postwar years see ourselves as children born of darkness." This is because they were taught that Japanese history culminating in the Pacific War had led to disaster. Cut off from their past, they lacked a sense of pride as Japanese: "Who are we? How can we be ourselves? In order to make these simple questions meaningful we must once more review the significance of the war."¹⁰⁰ Observing that the postwar generation earlier harbored an

anti-American nationalism in the form of anti-treaty protest, and that later on one hand this took the form of Nakagawa's patronizing attitude, and on the other of conversion to support for the Security Treaty, it is possible to see a bifurcation of attitudes.

The postwar generation's view of the nation has been above all shaped by an education system whose content is notable for its blandness. Despite decades of effort by the Ministry of Education to inject a nationalist tone, the social science textbooks retain the progressive view. In these texts, writes Thomas Rohlen in his recent authoritative Japan's High Schools, "modern Japan emerges as a benign country seeking good relations with all nations. The goal is peace, and the answer is not stronger alliances or power balances or more principled action: it is the United Nations. Nowhere in the world is the U. N. more popular or viewed with greater naive optimism."¹⁰¹

The combination of untempered confidence in their abilities and restless search for a clearer sense of their identity seems capable of producing a stronger nationalism in the postwar generation as time goes on. For example, one notable sector of this generation, young businessmen, there are already striking signs of assertive nationalist sentiment. The Japanese Youth Assembly (Nihon seinen kaigisho), which is the Japanese equivalent of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and is referred to as JC, is made up of the managers of medium and small industry, regional and local leaders, and young businessmen. The average age of its 55,000 members is 34; their average salary ¥4,500,000. Their nationalism is characterized by confidence and pride in postwar economic achievement. In 1980, the JC elected a president who was determined to make Japanese defense a major concern of the

organization. Even he was surprised at the nationalistic overtones in the response to a questionnaire sent out to its membership in 1981: 35% favored revision of Article 9, 68% favored strengthening Japan's defenses, 63% expressed fear of invasion, 33% favored conscription, 87% recognized the necessity of a patriotic education.¹⁰² The JC sent a delegation to Europe in 1980 to study security issues and after its return in July convened a national conference of young businessmen on the theme "Japanese Security and Defense." The conference issued a statement which asked: "As young men how should we deal with issues of peace and security? Is it proper...to continue to depend on the young people of America to carry the burden and make the sacrifices for us in time of emergency?" It went on to criticize reliance on "vague interpretations of the Peace Constitution" and concluded that Japan, as a great economic power, should not rely on another country. Military cooperation with the U.S. is not ruled out, but it should be on the basis of much greater independence. As Professor Otake points out in his analysis, the thrust of the JC view is for an autonomous defense and its overall position is congruent with the new nationalism of Shimizu and others. It should be stressed that the JC actively distributed copies of Shimizu's book, Nippon yo, kokka tare, and worked with him to build local support throughout the country for passage of the Era Name legislation.

There is evidence that a still more conservative generation began to take shape in the late 1970s. I am calling this "the high growth generation" because it appears determined to preserve the living standard and benefits of the high economic growth period. It is starting out far more conservative and less idealistic than the postwar

generation which in its student days was imbued with the ideals of the progressives and gave leadership to radical movements beginning with opposition to the Security Treaty. The Asahi Shinbun, observing the results of polls taken in April 1978 by the University of Tokyo's student newspaper, declared that student radicalism appeared to be a thing of the past. In the course of one year from 1977 to 1978 the percentage of incoming freshmen supporting the LDP doubled from 23% to 45%. Support for the Japan Communist Party dropped from 23% in 1977 to 3% in 1978. Surveys conducted by Professors Inoguchi and Kabashima in the early 1980s confirm this remarkable change of student attitudes. They conclude that "University of Tokyo students are indeed becoming more conservative.... They support keeping Japan's defense capability, the Japan-U.S. security setup, and the Emperor's power at their present levels. And they are stronger in their support of the status quo than the general public is."¹⁰³

Many studies of this new generation in the 1980s have charted its retreat from progressivism and from ideology, its status-quo orientation, its narcissism and desire for self-gratification. A 1985 survey of popular attitudes commissioned by the Ministry of Finance draws on a range of survey data to profile the conservative attitudes of young people.¹⁰⁴ It shows an increased attachment to the place where they live but a declining interest in participating in community activities and, instead, an inclination toward individual pursuits such as sports and hobbies. Their political party preferences mirror those of the whole population, youth support for the LDP having increased from 13% in 1973 to 31% in 1983. This MOF study concludes that while progressivism and desire to reform society have dramatically declined

among youth, the new conservatism has not yet translated into a greater sense of patriotism. The strong implication is that nationalism is seen as threatening the status quo and the tranquil pursuit of personal interests.

IX. A Japanese Identity for the Twenty-first Century

With a strong sense of having fulfilled their overriding ambition of the past century by catching up to the West, the Japanese could now drift toward an assertive political nationalism or they could subside into a complacent conservatism permitting themselves to enjoy their hard-won affluence. Both trends are evident in Japanese society. But the elite leadership appears determined that neither trend should prevail. One of the most interesting and noteworthy developments of the past decade is the efforts of the elites to galvanize the nation and to build consensus around a new set of national goals to replace the old fulfilled ones. These goals have a strong nationalist element, but it is more akin to the economic nationalism that has prevailed in the postwar era than it is to the new nationalism of recent years. The goals envision nothing less than Japanese global leadership in economic and technological development and pioneering a new historical stage in human social evolution. It is possible to see this development as an extension of, and adjustment to new conditions of, the Yoshida Doctrine.

Beginning in the late 1970s there was a mounting interest among the bureaucratic, political, business, and intellectual elites in planning for the twenty-first century, stimulated by Prime Minister Ohira's appointment of several blue-ribbon commissions and study groups. Such determined national planning for the long-range future is unequalled in any other country. During the postwar period much of the intellectual community had been alienated and opposed to the conservative establishment, but in the past decade as progressivism has declined a growing number of intellectuals are working closely with the government ministries and the LDP. Miki consulted informally with

intellectuals, but Ohira brought them into the policy planning process and, particularly, used them to study various aspects of the changes to be expected as Japan advanced into the new century. Their reports are collected in two volumes entitled Kindai o koete (Beyond the Modern Age), published in 1983. The trend of using intellectuals to work with the leaders of other elites in planning world leadership for the next century has accelerated during the Nakasone administration.

The heart of much of the leadership for this elite planning has been in the Ministry of Finance, with which Ohira had a special relationship and which has been the most powerful ministry in the postwar decades. Among MOF bureaucrats there is a strong sense that Japan, having "caught up," no longer has a sense of the kind of historical development the future technology is likely to promote. Without the example that the advanced industrial societies provided, Japan's leadership is seeking to formulate for itself the future course of economic, technological, and social organization. The term most often used to sum up a whole bundle of ideas and images is "information society" (joho shakai), widely regarded as the next stage of universal social evolution. "All industrial societies," writes a senior researcher at the Nomura Institute, "including Japan, are expected, without exception, to move toward information-centered society in the coming years."¹⁰⁵ In the past decade, an immense and varied literature has sprung up to describe the revolutionary consequences of this new stage of human and technological development. It is intensively debated and discussed at the highest levels of government. A study commissioned by the Ministry of Finance in 1982 argues that an entirely new body of economic theory, called "softnomics," is required to analyze the

transition from an emphasis on hardware and goods in industrial society to an emphasis on software, or such invisibles as information and services, in information society.¹⁰⁶

Prime Minister Nakasone, addressing the Diet on February 6, 1984 shortly after his re-election, spoke of "the unknown challenges of the 21st century." What was striking about his vision was his stress on "the achievement of a sophisticated information society [as] an important strategic element in medium and long-term economic development for the twenty-first century." He promised to promote policies and "establish a national consensus on what we want of the information society and to respond appropriately on a broad range of fields including frontier technology research and development."¹⁰⁷ This optimistic image of the Japanese future and of its revolutionary implications is one that has clearly captivated the Prime Minister and his advisors. In a little-noticed address to the Japan Society in New York, following the Williamsburg summit, Nakasone envisioned Japan's future development in "the electronics and communication technology necessary to sustain an information society.... The achievement of the information society seems primary, since it goes beyond changes in the production structure and...will mean the unfolding of a new and unprecedented stage of development. This may take 20 or even 30 years to realize, yet we should not let the long time span deter us."¹⁰⁸

A variety of ambitious and high visibility projects receiving official encouragement and sponsorship have become symbols of the drive toward an information society. These include a variety of new media such as the Information Network System (INS), a new telecommunication network pushed by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone; Community Antenna

Television (CATV); and the Character and Telephone Access Information Network (CAPTAIN) to provide vast amounts of home information. The fifth generation computer has received international attention, but a far more ambitious project is MITI's plan to develop 14 "technopolises" as a means of diffusing the most advanced technologies into regional centers as the backbone of the Japanese economy in the twenty-first century.

Since Herman Kahn and other futurologists first spoke about the twenty-first century as Japan's, there has been a growing anticipation of the advent of the year 2000. There is a sense, encouraged as much by foreign as by Japanese forecasting, of the torch of world leadership passing to a new country. Daniel Bell, whose book, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973) was itself instrumental in promoting the Japanese fascination with the concept of an information society, spoke at the 1983 Suntory Foundation Seminar on the end of "the American century." He observed that in the 1970s "Japan entered into World-History (to use Hegel's phrase)." Expounding the mystique of Japan's destiny, he continued:

At some point, a nation or a culture manifests a surge of creativity or energy which leads it to a dominant position in military power, economic or technological leadership, and artistic and cultural expression. There is an efflorescence of 'genius' or uniqueness, its neighbors are overshadowed, eclipsed or even enslaved, literally or metaphorically, and its reign seems eternal. During that period of 'grandeur and glory' it becomes a model for the rest of the world...and that leading nation establishes itself on the stage of History.¹⁰⁹

Following on the studies begun under Ohira, MOF organized in 1984 a project of impressive proportions to study the "next stage of civilization" which Japan is thought to be leading. MOF established 39

teams of experts, 500 in all, from various academic disciplines, industry, and government to undertake research on various aspects of the projected new civilization. One of the key leaders in this effort is the Tokyo University economist, Murakami Yasusuke. In a series of recent essays he sees the emergence of a new phase of industrial civilization following the oil crisis of 1973. This "twenty-first-century system, the system of so-called high technology" will bring with it an entirely new "paradigm": novel behavior patterns and modes in using the new technology; new groups of specialists in producing and operating the new technology; as well as a hitherto unfamiliar set of varied infrastructures, including large and multipurpose cables, huge data bases, and a new educational system; and a transformed social system. He observed in January 1984 that "there are more than a few people who consider the call for an 'information society' a simple dream, but broadly speaking history is moving in that direction. If the Japanese people are hesitant it is inevitable that someone else will provide the move toward an information society." The question for the coming decades, he muses, seems to be, "will Japan be able to mature as a completely new leading nation, originating not from Europe or America?"¹¹⁰

This question of Japan's readiness for world economic leadership and for a role in the governance of the international system is on the minds of Japanese leaders. Japan recently requested, and ultimately was granted, the position of second largest shareholder in the World Bank after the United States. In terms of voting power on the bank's executive board it was moved from fifth to the No. 2 spot ahead of Britain, Germany, and France. The 1984 White Paper of the Ministry of

International Trade and Industry envisions Japan emerging as the center of world finance, becoming the leading capital exporter much as Great Britain did at the height of its power in the nineteenth century and as the U.S. did in the heyday of the Pax Americana immediately after World War II. Such a role is seen resulting from inevitable recurrent Japanese trade surpluses owing to inherent structural strengths such as technical innovation, productivity, and high savings that will always give Japanese manufacturers an edge over their trading partners.

A recent article by Eguchi Yujiro, senior economist at Nomura Research Institute, typifies much of the elite thinking. He describes the torch of world leadership passing to Japan as it once had to America, and earlier Britain, and much earlier the Roman Empire:

If present trends continue, Japan will doubtless become the world's leading creditor nation within a decade, assuming the position formerly held by Britain and then by the United States. Ten years from now... Japan will have net external assets of \$500 billion, a level far in excess of America's foreign holdings at their peak. Both Britain and the United States created and ran international systems with themselves at the top when they were the leading creditors. Now it is Japan's turn to come up with an international system suited to itself. History records the Roman Empire, the British Empire, and the United States of America as major creditors. In each case the power in question created and ran an international system fitting the conditions in which it found itself.¹¹¹

Eguchi writes that the immense cost of military spending means that Japan must build its international system without resorting to military power but instead should "concentrate on developing the software to operate an international system": a strong currency; economic reserves to invest abroad; diplomatic, cultural, and business strengths; and an information system that will permit the best country-risk analysis skills. The costly military aspects of the international system will

have to be left to the United States and this will provide a good match: "If Japan and the United States, facing each other across the Pacific Ocean, can complement each other, the former as a major creditor nation and the latter as a major debtor, the prospect for a broad-based relationship will open up." The proposal is breathtaking in its optimism that Japan can remain free of political-strategic concerns. What we have in fact here is the projection of the Yoshida Doctrine into the twenty-first century and the new information society: "By limiting defense strength to annual outlays of 1% of GNP and putting first-rate information power to work, we can leave history a new example: a major creditor nation that is a minor military power."

What would be the implications of Japan's achieving world economic and technological leadership and pioneering in the development of a new stage of social evolution? The relative decline of American power raises serious questions about governance of the international system. As Professor Murakami observed, "the Pax Americana system...is about to be forced to undergo a reorganization because America's reliability is no longer absolute in the economic field." Along with the concern about Japan's readiness for leadership in the world system comes anxiety about the psychological reaction of the American ally who must be relied on for the security guarantee. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, an advisory committee appointed by the late Prime Minister Ohira, which issued its report in July 1980, hinted at this problem. The Report acknowledged that Japanese-American cooperation will be difficult since Japan's per capita GNP will likely overtake that of the United States; and "Japanese manufactured products will by and large be more competitive on the international market, and Japanese exports will

continue to expand faster than U.S. exports. In this sense, the positions of the two economies are being reversed, and this itself will entail difficult psychological problems."¹¹² The highly popular science writer and senior researcher at Nomura Research Institute, Moritani Masanori, put the matter less delicately. He wrote in 1982 that Japan's vast technological strength had come to be feared and to be the source of mounting frustration: "And if things continue unchanged, that fear will explode into anger. If this were not a nuclear age, it is possible that bombs might be falling on Japan even now." He concluded that restraint and caution, or "looking out when you're number one," were essential.¹¹³ The issue of what role Japan's economic power will create in political and strategic affairs remains unanswered and the source of great debate and soul-searching reflection. Many influential Japanese profess to believe that the importance of military power in international relations is declining owing to the advent of nuclear weapons, increased economic interdependency, and a growing global consciousness. For the moment, at least, most members of Japan's elite leadership believe that Japan must continue to work closely with the United States, deferring to its overall leadership of the alliance. Okazaki Hisahiko observed in 1979 that "if we continue to bet on the Anglo-Saxons we should be safe for at least 20 years."¹¹⁴

The writing in Japan about the twenty-first century is probably more extensive than in any other country. It is remarkable for its optimism about the nature of the projected "information society" and its belief that the Japanese people are best suited for the challenges of this society. One's impression is that there is less concern than in other countries about the loss of privacy, the dangers of unemployment,

and the vulnerability of society to control by technocrats. Rather, there is a notable self-confidence in facing this brave new world. A blue ribbon commission of economists and bureaucrats assembled by the Ministry of Finance and known as the Study Group on the Structural Transformation of the Economy and Its Policy Implications (keizai no kozo henka to seisaku no kenkyukai) concludes that, unlike the social systems of the West, Japanese society possesses characteristics well adapted to the new era. For example, Japan will be better able to deal with the dehumanizing problems of an information society because "the basic characteristic of Japanese culture is that, as shown in the Japanese word ningen, it values 'the relationship between persons' (hito to hito no aidagara)."¹¹⁵ The problem of maintaining a balance between the whole society and the individual, a relationship greatly intensified in the information society, will be better handled in the "contextualist" Japanese social pattern than in the atomistic nature of Western society. Moritani writes in his popular book that the "age of the American way of life, that lifestyle envied by the world since the 1950s, has ended." In place of its wasteful ways and addiction to big consumer products, Japan "should create its own 'Japanese way of life' and proselytize it throughout the world."¹¹⁶

The Japanese elites are, in my judgment, taking the lead in formulating a new set of national goals and, as Nakasone promised in his February 1984 Diet speech, trying to build a national consensus to support this vision. In offering the prospect of global leadership this vision clearly has much to offer Japanese pride and self-esteem. It gives place as well to unique Japanese values that emerge from the past to serve a new role in the future. At the same time this vision seeks

to avoid a narrow political nationalism. Instead the elites put stress on cooperation and "internationalization" as an essential part of achieving these goals. It is not yet clear that this vision has wide popular acceptance. Certainly the decision to mount EXPO '85 with its theme of Japanese science in the twenty-first century was intended to motivate the Japanese people. However, a public opinion poll by the Asahi Shinbun designed to elicit popular feelings about the future appeared to show growing apprehension about the implications of the new technology. Results of the annual poll announced January 3, 1985 indicated that 60% of the respondents "feel uneasy" (fuan o kanjiru) about scientific and technological progress, a 10% increase since the first poll was taken in 1978. A specialist in social psychology has criticized the elite planners of the "advanced information society" for concentrating on the economics of advanced technology and neglecting the human factor in planning for the new era.¹¹⁷

X. Conclusion

Discussions of the reemergence of Japanese nationalism usually assume a revival of the extremism of the 1930s form of nationalism. I have argued that this assumption is unwarranted. In the first place, the catch-up period, which caused such an intense inferiority, insecurity, and resentment toward the West, is now over. Japan today is characterized by a widespread pride and self-confidence in its postwar achievements and by a belief that Japan has caught up with and, at least in some fields, overtaken the West. These feelings are qualitatively different from prewar nationalism which was asserted in order to compensate for Japanese backwardness. Such assertions took on a virulent, pathological quality because they were intended to overcome the objective reality of the West's more advanced economic and technological development and the fact that Japan was compelled to borrow so much of Western culture.

Secondly, a difference of immense importance between the 1930s and 1980s is the contrasting roles of the elite leadership. In the prewar period the elites deliberately created, promoted, and used nationalism to mobilize the popular will for the hard struggles and sacrifices required by industrialization and imperial expansion. Today, the elites consciously seek to suppress and contain political nationalism. The mainstream adherents of the Yoshida Doctrine find it in Japan's national interest to pursue economic development and technological achievement. For them the rise of nationalism would portend their loss of mastery over Japanese political developments. The cautious and shrewd pursuit of Japanese interests in the postwar period has depended upon a pragmatic approach that would be greatly complicated by popular

nationalism. Moreover it would greatly complicate Japan's foreign relations and potentially jeopardize its international economic requirements. For all these reasons, the mainstream elites seek to preserve the Yoshida strategy and extend it into the twenty-first century. They are encouraging "internationalization" in a variety of ways because they see this in Japan's interest.

Thirdly, nationalism in the prewar period was built on traditional cultural symbols. The bureaucracy politicized the native folk religion and manipulated the imperial institution as its supreme symbol in order to motivate a people emerging from the prolonged isolation of a feudal past. Today, there is in the older generation attachment to the symbols of prewar nationalism, but indifference is the rule with the postwar generation. As Murakami Yasusuke, who has studied contemporary middle class mass society, describes the situation: "Public opinion polls indicate that the new middle mass has little motivation for recreating a Japanese identity centered around any traditional symbol. This is especially true of the younger generation, whose growing indifference to the Emperor is conspicuous."¹¹⁸ There are, of course, nationalist and right wing movements which adhere to the nationalist symbols, but they have had little success and then only where they moderate their means and ends.

Fourth, nationalism in the prewar period had its social basis in the villages where the great majority of Japanese had their roots. The bearers of nationalism were the lower middle-class groups--shopkeepers, small businessmen, grade school and elementary school teachers, clerical workers in government and business--who had risen only part way up the educational ladder of success and who resented industrialism and the

luxury, corruption, and un-Japanese cosmopolitanism of the businessmen and politicians. The social structure and politics of postwar Japan have been greatly transformed. The social and cultural divisions are lessened. Ninety per cent of the population regards itself as middle class. It is overwhelmingly urban, well-educated, well-read, well-traveled, perhaps as well-informed of international conditions as any people, and thoroughly imbued with the values and tastes of industrial society.

Finally, in contrast to the relative isolation from international contacts in the 1930s, Japan's interaction with other countries is presently growing at a rapid rate--not only in commodity trade, but in the capital, technology, and information fields. By 1983 there were 4,600 Japanese subsidiaries abroad employing 860,000 persons. Japan's direct investment abroad is now over \$10 billion, while investment in Japan by foreign firms has tripled in the last decade and over 27,000 foreign business people reside in Japan. Japanese leadership is placing great emphasis on "internationalization" through a variety of programs for business, the schools, and local communities. A recent series of studies has argued that much of this internationalization has been superficial and a 1985 poll purports to show some popular resistance to the government calls for internationalization.¹¹⁹ In this poll, the percentage of respondents who were convinced that Japanese should have a sense of internationality dropped from 26% to 23%, while those saying that Japanese should have a lifestyle befitting themselves increased from 53% to 55%.

In sum, the growing national pride and self-confidence today exists in conditions substantially different from the prewar period. I

have described it as a popular "mood" in the sense that it is a widespread feeling, inchoate and free floating; and it is formless in that, except on the far Right, there is no nationalist movement.

This nationalist mood is likely to grow. The dramatic decline of progressivism, particularly among the high growth generation, will contribute to this trend. Japanese nationalism is likely to be more open and forward looking than in the past, building on pride in Japan's special capabilities for the twenty-first century. This is unmistakably the direction in which the Japanese elites seek to channel the nationalist mood.

Whether or not nationalism takes on increasing political dimensions will depend heavily on developments outside of Japan in the international environment. It is instructive that the recent efflorescence of nationalism at the beginning of the 1980s was largely influenced by international developments, i.e. the relative decline in American power, the Soviet military build-up in Northeast Asia, and the growing strains in the alliance with the U.S. created by the mounting trade friction. The elite adherents of the Yoshida Doctrine who seek to extend it into the next century acknowledge their greatest challenge to be preserving national will and morale while maintaining a low political profile in international affairs.

In light of what we have said about the different conditions of nationalism today, we need not regard the emergence of a more political nationalism as unwelcome. On the contrary, we can scarcely expect Japan to bear an appropriate share of the defense burden without the development of the political dimensions of nationalism. There are likely to be some anti-American overtones in such nationalism.

Inevitably, as we have seen, there is resentment toward aspects of our wartime and postwar activities. This is evident among the new nationalists. But the more fundamental thrust of both the military realists and the new nationalists is pro-American in the sense that they generally wish to see the alliance strengthened through greater reciprocity and even equality. A political nationalism would be unhealthy only if it took place in conditions of mounting trade frictions and resentment over the unequal aspects of the alliance. Creative American statesmanship should be directed toward the emergence of a healthy political nationalism and the resolution of problems in the alliance and trade relations.

7

Footnotes

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